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ABSTRACT
The first rule of administrative law is that discretion can be dangerous.
Although discretion is often used for its intended purposes, scholars of the
regulatory process understand from both theory and experience that unintended
consequences sometimes result. This is one reason why the Supreme Court is
cautious when it comes to agency discretion. After decades of preventing
agencies from acting in arbitrary or even self-interested ways, the modern Court
has developed a fairly sophisticated understanding of the risks and rewards of
discretion and why it is essential to pay attention to incentives.
That is, unless the Supreme Court is addressing judicial discretion. Then, its
sophistication all too often gets tossed aside. Qualified immunity is a perfect
example. In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court granted judges confronting novel
civil-rights claims maximalist discretion whether to decide constitutional
questions for the public’s benefit. The intent behind this new discretion is sound:
flexibility allows judges to balance constitutional avoidance versus
constitutional stagnation in light of case-specific factors. What the Court forgot,
however, is that discretion can also have unintended consequences.
This Article addresses perhaps the most serious of these unintended
consequences: strategic behavior by judges. While the Court recognizes that
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federal agencies may have incentives to use discretion in strategic ways, neither
the Justices nor scholars have considered the strategic considerations that can
influence a judge’s discretionary decision to clearly establish constitutional
rights. The potential for strategic behavior is especially sharp, moreover, when
discretion to decide constitutional questions is combined with discretion to issue
unpublished, nonprecedential opinions. To illustrate this danger, this Article
examines real-world judicial decisionmaking. Reviewing over 800 published
and unpublished circuit decisions, this Article identifies significant “panel
effects”: politically unified panels are more likely to exercise discretion either
to find no constitutional violation, for “all Republican” panels, or to recognize
new constitutional rights, for “all Democratic” panels. The decision to publish
also may be used strategically. For instance, one in five decisions recognizing
new constitutional rights is unpublished. This potential for strategic behavior—
as in the administrative law context—counsels in favor of reform.
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INTRODUCTION
The “perennial question” in administrative law, now-Justice Elena Kagan
reminds us, is “how to ensure appropriate control of agency discretion.”1 The
danger is that although discretion can be and, indeed, usually is used for the
public’s benefit,2 it can also serve self-interested ends3—for instance by
allowing regulators to make their own lives easier.4 In other words, discretion
carries with it the potential for strategic behavior by using flexibility intended
for one purpose to achieve another, more self-serving purpose. The upshot of
that realization, especially when combined with the reality that sometimes
agencies behave arbitrarily, is that today’s Supreme Court often doubts whether
agencies can police themselves. Invoking the presumption of judicial review, for
example, Justice Kagan has recently explained that discretion is too important
to leave in an agency’s “hands alone.”5 This sort of sophisticated understanding
of discretion is key to administrative law.6
The Supreme Court, however, has a blind spot: judicial discretion. When it
comes to agencies, the Justices frequently recognize both discretion’s benefits
and costs and the risk that agencies will behave strategically. But when it comes
to judges, the Court may put its skepticism aside.7 Both agencies and courts,
1 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2254 (2001). See also Elizabeth
Magill, Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 859 (2009) (“Discretion is at the center
of most accounts of bureaucracy.”).
2 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Shaw, H. L. A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127
HARV. L. REV. 666, 668 (2013).
3 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 1332, 1334 (2008) (“The expansion of the administrative state has showcased the dangers associated
with the exercise of discretion.”).
4 See, e.g., NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Complainants the agency
‘likes’ can be excused, while ‘difficult’ defendants can find themselves drawing the short straw.”); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
461, 472–73 (2003) (“[A]gency discretion [may be used] to satisfy private or selfish interests at public
expense.”).
5 Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1652 (2015). But see Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling
Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2014) (questioning the presumption).
6 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 619 (1927).
7 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and MetaStandards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 821 (2002) (observing the “danger of lower court discretion”); cf. Kathryn
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however, exercise discretionary power,8 and both face complex incentives
regarding how to use that power.9 Courts, moreover, like agencies, can issue
decisions that profoundly affect the lives of individuals and the public, especially
since “[a] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most
executive or judicial action.”10
Perhaps the best example of the Court’s blind spot is qualified immunity. In
2009, the Court in Pearson v. Callahan granted judges maximalist discretion in
these cases: whenever someone seeks damages from many types of government
officials based on a novel constitutional claim, the judges deciding the claim can
choose—in their “sound discretion”—whether to decide the constitutional
question or instead to simply dismiss it as barred by qualified immunity.11 The
intended purpose of this discretion is to empower judges to consider casespecific factors, such as whether an argument is well briefed,12 before resolving
a constitutional question. This new discretion can be, and no doubt often is, used
in socially optimal ways. But it also has a dark side: such discretion empowers
judges to act in “strategic” ways (i.e., ways that may benefit judges), especially
when the discretionary power to recognize new constitutional rights is combined
with the discretionary power to issue unpublished, nonprecedential opinions.
For instance, as explained in this Article, judges may choose to exercise their
discretion to clarify constitutional doctrine for reasons that have nothing to do
with, say, the objective quality of the briefing but rather because doing so is
consistent with ideological preferences. Or judges may decline to clarify
constitutional doctrine because the panel disagrees on how to do so, and it is
unpleasant for judges to write and respond to dissents. These sorts of strategic
uses of discretion may allow judges to avoid criticism, sidestep controversy, and
advance ideological preferences, even though such outcomes are not the purpose
of Pearson discretion. Needless to say, the Supreme Court did not intend to
enable strategic behavior on the part of judges. But if administrative law teaches

A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (noting
the dangers of Supreme Court discretion).
8 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407–08 (2008).
9 See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755,
1759–60 (2013) (discussing agency incentives); Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism:
False Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2494–95 (2014) (book review)
(discussing judicial incentives).
10 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (emphasis added).
11 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009).
12 See id. at 239 (noting that “woefully inadequate” briefs foster “bad decisionmaking”).
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us anything, it teaches that when it comes to discretion, unintended
consequences are real.
To appreciate the danger of discretion in qualified immunity cases, one must
step back and understand qualified immunity and the procedural puzzle it
creates. It is no secret that the Supreme Court pays close attention to suits against
police officers and other government actors—especially when officers may be
on the hook for damages. Nor is the reason secret: the Court’s worry “is
essentially the same as that in First Amendment overbreadth cases—that the
prospect of civil liability will induce timidity and caution in the exercise of
government powers that generally operate to the public good.”13
Perhaps nowhere is the Justices’ wariness about chilling government conduct
more pronounced than with qualified immunity. Few disagree that officers who
knowingly violate the Constitution should be punished—including by paying
damages. Yet the threat of liability for unknowing violations may cause officers
to flinch from the “discharge of their duties,” to the detriment of innocent third
parties who depend on state protection.14 Hence, it is now blackletter law that
“officials [need] breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments.”15
And this “reasonable mistake” principle is no platitude. By their own account,
“[b]ecause of the importance of qualified immunity ‘to society as a whole,’” the
Justices give special weight to these cases in deciding whether to grant
certiorari.16
Qualified immunity, however, is also controversial.17 Even if an officer has
violated the Constitution, she cannot be personally liable unless the rights were
“clearly established” at the time. For example, even though strip-searching
students can be unconstitutional, the officials who conducted a strip-search in
Safford Unified School District v. Redding did not have to pay damages because

13 John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 244 (2013). But see
Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 952–60 (2014) (questioning this “chill”
argument regarding whether the risk of civil liability makes government officials too cautious).
14 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
15 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012).
16 City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814).
17 See, e.g., JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION 106 (2014) (urging that qualified immunity be banned by constitutional amendment); Stephen R.
Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing
Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate
Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1244 (2015) (denouncing qualified immunity for “limiting the ability
of all persons to receive the protections of the Constitution”).
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the law was not “sufficiently clear.”18 Likewise, last year in San Francisco v.
Sheehan, the Court awarded immunity to police officers who shot a mentally-ill
woman; the Court reasoned, that even assuming the officers should have
accommodated her illness, her rights were not clearly established.19 Nor are
these cases outliers,20 especially when the Court’s “shadow docket” is
considered.21 Citing Sheehan, for instance, the Court recently summarily
reversed the Third Circuit in a case involving “suicide screening” of those in
custody.22 And even more recently, the Court summarily awarded immunity to
an officer who, while standing on an overpass, shot and killed a driver below.23
Notably writing only for herself, Justice Sonia Sotomayor criticized
“sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing.”24
The controversy, however, goes beyond substance; it also includes
procedure.25 Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability whenever the
asserted right was not clearly established. This means that a plaintiff seeking
money damages must clear two hurdles. She must prove not only that the officer
violated her rights, but also that any competent officer would have known at the
time that he was doing so. This creates a dilemma. If the “right” was not clearly
established, the plaintiff cannot prevail. But then why would a court ever reach
the constitutional merits of novel theories?26 The principle of constitutional
avoidance suggests that courts confronting new constitutional claims—such as
those involving novel technologies or situations—should simply dismiss them.
Yet avoidance has a problem of its own: if courts always do that, novel claims
may never be clearly established. Constitutional avoidance may devolve into
“constitutional stagnation.”27

18

557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009).
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1775.
20 See id. at 1774 n.3 (citing five separate cases from the preceding three years).
21 William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 1 (2015);
see also Scott Michelman, Taylor v. Barkes: Summary Reversal Is Part of a Qualified Immunity Trend,
SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June 2, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/taylor-v-barkes-summaryreversal-is-part-of-a-qualified-immunity-trend/.
22 Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam).
23 See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (per curiam). At the same time, the Court summarily
vacated and remanded another case in light of Mullenix. Pickens v. Aldaba, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (mem.).
24 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
25 See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for
Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1604 (2011).
26 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241 (2009) (discussing “the ‘older, wiser . . . counsel “not to
pass . . . constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable”’” (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
388 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring))).
27 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
19
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The Supreme Court has struggled with this procedural puzzle. The solution
the Justices have settled on is judicial discretion. In Pearson, the Court
unanimously held that judges, exercising their “sound discretion,” are free to
decide constitutional questions for the benefit of future litigants or, if they wish,
to jump directly to the clearly established prong—for instance where the
constitutional briefing is “woefully inadequate.”28 Since 2009, the Court has
exercised this discretion over ten times,29 and lower courts have exercised it
thousands of times. Because of the critical role that qualified immunity cases
play in explicating constitutional rights, it is unsurprising that much has been
written about whether this new discretion strikes the right balance between
constitutional avoidance and stagnation.30 Judge Reinhardt, for instance, argues
that the Justices badly erred by allowing courts to ever sidestep constitutional
questions.31 Justices Kennedy and Scalia, by contrast, have hinted that courts
should never decide constitutional claims in these cases.32
Whether Pearson has achieved its intended consequence, in large part, is an
empirical question. In the real world, is constitutional stagnation a valid
concern? Elsewhere, we have shown that although stagnation fears are
overstated (since judges resolve constitutional questions most of the time), it is
true that this discretion may diminish recognition of new constitutional rights—
at least at the margins.33 The upshot of this empirical finding is that even on the
Supreme Court’s own “avoidance balanced against stagnation” terms, it is
debatable whether the Justices’ approach to judicial discretion in qualified
immunity cases is sound.

28

Id. at 236, 239.
See, e.g., Wesby v. District of Columbia, 816 F.3d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Indeed, in just the past five years, the Supreme Court has issued 11
decisions reversing federal courts of appeals in qualified immunity cases, including five strongly worded
summary reversals.”) (collecting authorities).
30 See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377, 396–409 (2014); Nancy Leong,
Rethinking the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 969, 973–77 (2011) [hereinafter
Leong, Rethinking the Order of Battle]; Reinhardt, supra note 17, at 1250.
31 Reinhardt, supra note 17, at 1249–50 (criticizing Pearson).
32 Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 714 (Scalia, J., concurring).
33 Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
Part IV.B provides an overview of the findings from The New Qualified Immunity, which examines post-Pearson
constitutional stagnation concerns, disparities across circuits, and a preliminary inquiry into the role of ideology.
See also Nancy Leong, A Fresh Look at Qualified Immunity, JOTWELL (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/?s=a+fresh+look+at+qualified+immunity (reviewing Nielson & Walker, supra).
This Article leverages that data to look beyond how Pearson discretion has been used in the circuit courts to
explore theoretically and empirically the more troubling unintended consequence of this discretion: how it
encourages strategic judicial behavior.
29
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This Article, however, addresses an unintended consequence of this new
discretion: strategic behavior by judges.34 At bottom, the Court has empowered
judges to decide whether to resolve constitutional questions without imposing
safeguards on how judges use that discretionary power.35 Given the nation’s
experience with administrative law, this development should raise red flags. In
creating this discretion, after all, the Justices appear to believe that lower-court
judges will clarify constitutional law only in certain classes of cases—such as
when “there would be little if any conservation of judicial resources” by not
resolving the constitutional merits36—while jumping to the clearly established
prong only in other classes of cases, including when “the constitutional question
is so factbound that the decision provides little guidance for future cases.”37 No
doubt such legitimate concerns play a major role in how judges opt to exercise
discretion. But are they all that go through a judge’s mind?
Almost certainly not. Discretion, after all, carries with it the opportunity for
strategic behavior. For instance, confronted with a Fourth Amendment suit for
damages, judges may choose not to reach the merits even though they are well
argued and important if doing so would splinter the panel. Because intra-panel
disagreements are unpleasant, judges presumably prefer to avoid them, all else
being equal.38 The panel thus may conclude it is easier to just dismiss the claim
as not clearly established, thereby trading law clarification, a public good, for
better personal relationships, a private good. While there can be sound reasons
not to decide constitutional questions, there also can be bad reasons—i.e.,
reasons that benefit judges but not the public. Discretion empowers judges to act
for both types of reasons.
The prospect of strategic behavior is more pronounced when combined with
the power to issue nonprecedential, “unpublished” opinions.39 To date, few
scholars or judges have considered the strategic possibilities that arise when a
discretionary power to issue nonprecedential opinions is exercised in qualified
immunity cases, much less what happens when such discretion is combined with
discretion to avoid constitutional questions altogether. Yet flexibility to issue
34 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV.
139, 143 (noting the risk of strategic behavior).
35 See id. at 142.
36 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
37 Id. at 237.
38 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 1399–1400 (2009)
(“Collegiality and ideology inevitably conflict.”).
39 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 107–08 (2002)
(describing unpublished opinions).

NIELSON-WALKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

9/26/2016 8:37 AM

STRATEGIC IMMUNITY

63

unpublished opinions is, if anything, especially important when it comes to
qualified immunity. Because damages can only be awarded if the law was
clearly established, the power to decide cases without clearly establishing any
law is significant.
These theoretical risks are alarming for a host of reasons. For instance, they
suggest not only that “constitutional stagnation” may be real, which itself would
be problematic, but also that sometimes it may not happen by accident. Instead,
certain judges may be avoiding the constitutional merits on purpose, even in
cases in which, per the factors announced in Pearson, the constitutional merits
should be decided.40 Moreover, these theoretical risks suggest that how
constitutional questions are decided—when they are decided—also may not be
by accident. Judges may elect to use their discretion to decide constitutional
questions, not based on the neutral characteristics of the case (e.g., whether the
question is important and well briefed), but instead based on the ideological
homogeneity of the panel.41 Likewise, there is a risk that judges sometimes may
use their discretion not to benefit the public but instead to insulate decisions from
further review by the en banc court or the Supreme Court. Whether Pearson is
sound on its own terms is debatable. But when these potential unintended
consequences are considered, Pearson discretion becomes much more
disquieting and its ultimate net value becomes much less apparent, at least
without further revision by the Justices.
This Article, however, does more than speculate about these theoretical risks.
Drawing on data from over 800 published and unpublished circuit court
decisions comprising nearly 1500 constitutional claims, this Article suggests
that these risks of strategic immunity may be manifesting themselves. For
instance, the data suggest that when it comes to constitutional litigation, the
ideological composition of a three-judge panel matters. Panels composed
unanimously of judges appointed by a Republican President are more likely to
exercise this new form of discretion to reach constitutional questions and, when
they do, are more likely to find no constitutional violation.42 Conversely, panels
entirely appointed by a Democratic President are more likely than any other type
of panel to recognize a new constitutional right. And judges appointed by a
Democratic President behave differently when they write, rather than join, an
opinion. On mixed panels, however, there are no statistically significant

40
41
42

Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 23–24.
See infra Part IV.C.1.
See id.
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differences in how the panels behave along these dimensions—regardless of
which party is in the majority on the panel. In other words, when panels are
ideologically divided, pronounced differences disappear, which itself could
suggest strategic behavior via a collegial concurrence or even a majority
compromise to avoid dissent.
The discretionary power not to publish decisions also may reflect strategic
behavior. Perhaps most strikingly, one in five decisions recognizing a new
constitutional right is not published43—meaning that the panel’s decision may
not even create liability in future qualified immunity cases. Moreover, judges
appointed by a Republican President seem more likely to deny qualified
immunity in unpublished decisions.44 Finally, the unpublished decisions reveal
a number of divided opinions where strategic compromise may be taking place.45
After all, a dissent from an opinion is some indication that the majority opinion
should have been published. Yet those decisions often are not published,
potentially suggesting that compromise or fear of further review—either by the
circuit en banc or the Supreme Court—may have led to its nonprecedential
status.
These findings counsel in favor of once more revising the procedures for
qualified immunity. Elsewhere, we have urged requiring judges to provide
reasons when exercising discretion in qualified immunity cases.46 The key
insight from this Article—that such discretion may be used strategically—
further supports a reason-giving requirement. The duty to give reasons,
moreover, should extend to the choice not to publish a qualified immunity
decision. Finally, in deciding whether to grant certiorari, the Supreme Court
should give more weight to panel composition and less weight to whether an
opinion is published. Although these solutions will not prevent all strategic
behavior, they can help minimize it in a cost-justified way. Indeed, because of
its wariness of agency discretion, the Court employs similar devices in the
context of administrative law to keep regulatory discretion in check. The Court
would do well to apply that same skepticism to this species of judicial
discretion.47

43

See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.C.1.
45 See id.
46 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 61.
47 Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009).
44
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches how qualified immunity
works and explains the broad discretion judges enjoy when it comes to clarifying
constitutional law. Part II then focuses on administrative law, explaining why
judges and scholars have come to be cautious about agency discretion. Part III,
in turn, applies those regulatory insights to the qualified immunity context to
show how and why judges might use their discretion for strategic purposes.
Part IV then presents the Article’s empirical methodology and findings. Finally,
Part V explains how qualified immunity’s procedural rules should be revised to
mitigate these unintended consequences.
I. THE NEW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The zigzagging story of qualified immunity’s procedural puzzle has been
told before.48 Here, we briefly summarize the puzzle. We first address the
substantive test for qualified immunity—whether a federal right was violated
and whether that federal right was “clearly established” at the time of violation.
Then, we discuss the procedure that judges use to apply that substantive test—
whether judges must first decide whether the federal right was violated, or
whether they can simply dismiss a claim because it was not clearly established,
assuming such a right exists. Both the substantive test for qualified immunity
and the procedural steps to apply that substantive test have generated
controversy. We conclude by addressing an important but often overlooked
aspect of the qualified immunity framework: the role of unpublished opinions.
The key takeaway is that, in Pearson, the Justices—driven by constitutional
avoidance on one hand but constitutional stagnation on the other—opted to
create a regime of maximalist discretion for judges. The intended result of this
discretionary regime is to allow lower courts to clarify constitutional rights when
it is appropriate based on certain characteristics of particular cases (e.g., it is an
important question with broad applicability that has been well briefed), while
giving them flexibility to avoid constitutional questions when such
characteristics are absent.49
A. The Substance of Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity has rightly been dubbed “the most important doctrine in
the law of constitutional torts.”50 This immunity exists at the pivot point between
48
49
50

See Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 15–23.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009).
John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 851–52 (2010).
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two principles. Rights generally have remedies,51 but the threat of liability has
behavioral consequences that can be problematic.52 Qualified immunity attempts
to reconcile, or at least accommodate, these principles by declaring that an
official can be liable for violating constitutional rights only if those rights were
“clearly established” at the time of their violation.
Needless to say, whether qualified immunity ought to exist is controversial.53
No one is pleased when constitutional rights are violated and the victim goes
uncompensated. The Supreme Court is mindful of that reality but routinely—
often without dissent—awards immunity.54 Indeed, despite the fact that
certiorari is discretionary, the Court devotes considerable attention to qualified
immunity, often to the benefit of officers.55 By their own account, the Justices
do this because the threat of damages has real-world consequences.56 Officers,
fearing personal liability, may hold back rather than act with boldness.57 Such
diffidence can be dangerous.58 Many innocent people depend on the vigorous
protection of the state.59
Nor is vicarious liability a silver bullet.60 The idea behind vicarious
liability—in particular, strict vicarious liability—is simple: whenever
government officials violate constitutional rights, whether clearly established or
not, the victim should be able seek compensation from the government itself.
51 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[This is] a government of laws, and
not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation
of a vested legal right.”). But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.1, at 421–25 (Wolters
Kluwer Law & Bus. 6th ed. 2012) (noting limits on this principle).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2555 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(explaining the “chilling” effect liability can have).
53 See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 17, at 1244; Jeffries, supra note 13, at 241 & n.121 (collecting
authorities).
54 See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) (collecting authorities).
55 Id. (explaining that “the Court often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual officers
to liability” and collecting authorities).
56 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (explaining that the threat of damages can cause
“undue interference” in officers’ responsibilities).
57 Id. at 814 (1982).
58 See, e.g., Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1775 (“Reynolds and Holder knew that Sheehan had a weapon and had
threatened to use it to kill three people. They also knew that delay could make the situation more dangerous.”);
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014) (“[I]t was Rickard who put Allen in danger by fleeing and
refusing to end the chase, and it would be perverse if his disregard for Allen’s safety worked to his benefit.”).
59 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (awarding qualified immunity to officials
investigating alleged child sexual abuse).
60 This same analysis applies to a regime in which the law imposes strict liability on officers but also
provides automatic employer indemnification. Under either regime, the money comes from the same place. See
Jeffries, supra note 13, at 232.
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This would remedy constitutional violations without subjecting individual
officers to liability, in theory curing any concern about “chilled” performance of
official duties. But this path is also imperfect, even leaving aside whether the
Constitution requires it. Courts may be reluctant to read rights expansively if
governments are on the hook for acts that, at the time, seemed reasonable. In
close cases, judges may be wary of, for instance, bankrupting a small town.61
Judges know that money spent on verdicts is money not spent on schools.62
The doctrine of qualified immunity tries to split the difference between
chilling official action and leaving citizens without remedies. Today, the
substantive test for qualified immunity comes from Harlow v. Fitzgerald,63
which “shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff
pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional
right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged
conduct.”64 As to the latter prong, “[a] Government official’s conduct violates
clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he
contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”65 While courts “do
not require a case directly on point,” they do require that “existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”66
Thus, for instance, even though no case specifically forbade handcuffing a
prisoner to a hitching post for hours, such conduct still violated the prisoner’s
clearly established rights because the guards had “fair warning” that such
conduct was unacceptable.67 Just how similar another case must be to the one at
61 See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 13, at 232, 241 n.122; see also Dave Munday & Glenn Smith, Small Town’s
Future Uncertain After ‘Astronomical’ Jury Verdict, POST & COURIER (Oct. 16, 2014, 10:00 PM),
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20141016/PC16/141019471/1177 (“A mix of shock, joy and uncertainty
buzzed in this tiny, rural community Thursday as residents contemplated how the town might pay a court
judgment so large it could fund the local budget for the next 162 years.”); Bruce Schreiner, Kentucky City Files
for Bankruptcy to Address Judgment—$11.4M Verdict 4 Times Hillview’s Budget, LEXINGTON HERALDLEADER, Aug. 22, 2015, at A5 (“A suburban city near Louisville has filed for bankruptcy, crippled by an $11.4
million jury verdict—nearly four times the city’s budget . . . .”).
62 See Pfander, supra note 25, at 1615 (citing, inter alia, John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98–105 (1999)).
63 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
64 Aschroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). Needless to say, this
standard for establishing qualified immunity varies with the procedural posture of a case; a plaintiff’s burden is
different at the motion-to-dismiss stage than at the summary-judgment or trial stage. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
65 Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
66 Id.
67 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
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hand for a right to be “clearly established” is a difficult question68—though the
Court is clear that judges should not rely on principles set at too high a level of
abstraction.69 Moreover, the “clearly established” analysis is concerned with
objective reasonableness, not an officer’s subjective belief,70 thereby allowing
judges to “resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation” and thus often avoiding the burdens of discovery.71
B. The Procedure of Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity also presents a procedural puzzle. Absent extraordinary
fact patterns, novel claims are not clearly established. That is why they are novel.
So doesn’t that mean that a court, confronted with a novel claim, should simply
dismiss it on qualified immunity’s second prong as not clearly established
without ever reaching whether the officer violated the Constitution? Courts
generally refuse to decide constitutional questions that are irrelevant to a
judgment. After all, “the ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint’ is that ‘if it is
not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.’”72
Why not apply the same “cardinal principle” in qualified immunity cases?
Resolving these sorts of “constitutional questions [requires considerable]
judicial resources.”73 Busy judges do not have a lot of time to spend on
unnecessary questions,74 especially if they are pressed by criminal trials and
sentencing, which should be resolved first.75 Given the large number of civil68 See, e.g., Michael S. Catlett, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified Immunity
Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2005) (“Although this inquiry sounds somewhat straightforward, in
practice it has created a number of recurring issues.”); Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV.
117 (2009) (discussing qualified immunity in excessive force cases).
69 See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015) (“Qualified immunity is
no immunity at all if ‘clearly established’ law can simply be defined as the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.”).
70 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
71 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991));
see also id. at 231 (“[T]he ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to
ensure that ‘insubstantial claims’ . . . [will] be resolved prior to discovery.”).
72 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 431 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905); Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas.
242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558) (Marshall, J.).
73 Morse, 551 U.S. at 430 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
74 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 14 (quoting Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity
Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 680–81 (2009)).
75 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 50 (“Scheduling preference must be given to criminal proceedings as far as
practicable.”); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012) (“Criminal cases . . . shall have priority, on the docket of the Supreme
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rights cases for damages on federal dockets, if courts were forced to decide
constitutional questions in all of them, other important work may suffer.
Despite its virtues, however, constitutional avoidance also has downsides,
especially when it comes to qualified immunity. Indeed, leapfrogging the
constitutional question could “stunt the development of the law and allow
government officials to violate constitutional rights with impunity.”76 “Because
a great deal of constitutional litigation occurs in cases subject to qualified
immunity,” as we have previously explained, “many rights potentially might
never be clearly established should a court ‘[simply] skip ahead to the question
whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in
the circumstances of the case.’”77
Of course, constitutional questions often are resolved in other contexts, such
as suits against municipalities or for injunctive relief to stop an ongoing
constitutional wrong.78 Likewise, criminal defendants can attempt to suppress
evidence via the exclusionary rule,79 and the Constitution can also be used as a
substantive defense.80 Even so, these options are not perfect substitutes for a
civil lawsuit for damages.81 For instance, there is no theory of respondeat
superior liability against municipalities.82 Likewise, because of Article III’s
standing requirement, suits for injunctive relief often require something akin to
an ongoing violation, which does not capture, say, an isolated case of police
brutality.83 The exclusionary rule, similarly, is a poor fit for many sorts of claims
that do not have a tight nexus with criminal investigations. Many First
Amendment rights might fall in this category. Moreover, as the Supreme Court

Court, over all cases except cases to which the United States is a party and such other cases as the court may
decide to be of public importance.”).
76 Beermann, supra note 34, at 149.
77 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 12 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482–83 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he
defendant . . . is able to present his case . . . to preserve the defendant’s constitutional rights.”); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (recognizing that defendants may raise the First or Fourth Amendments as a
defense).
81 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 12.
82 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (holding that a “failure to train” theory requires
more than a single violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), even if the consequence was that an
innocent man sat on death row for nearly two decades).
83 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
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cuts back on the exclusionary rule,84 the Court also renders it a less perfect
substitute for a damages suit.85 Finally, constitutional defenses require
prosecutors (with discretion of their own) to bring cases and judges to decide
them; neither is inevitable, especially given plea-bargaining.86
But what can be done, on one hand, to prevent constitutional stagnation
without, on the other, overworking judges? There is no great answer. In Saucier
v. Katz, the Court declared that “[i]n a suit against an officer for an alleged
violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense
must be considered in proper sequence.”87 First, a court must decide whether “in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”88 And “[i]f no
constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,
there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity,” but
“if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions,
the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.”89
Otherwise, the public “might be deprived of . . . explanation were a court simply
to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s
conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.”90
Saucier, however, was short lived. From “essentially the moment the Court
mandated the two-step sequence, a diverse coalition of Justices, lower-court
judges, and scholars began criticizing it.”91 Within a handful of years, for
instance, Justice Stevens called Saucier an “unwise judge-made rule,”92 and
Justice Breyer pleaded to “end the failed Saucier experiment now.”93
The result was that just eight years after announcing Saucier, the Justices
unanimously overruled it in Pearson. Writing for the Court, Justice Alito
84 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (limiting the rule’s application to “where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974))).
85 See Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the TwentyFirst Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 887–88 (2010).
86 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009).
87 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
88 Id. at 201.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 17.
92 Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
93 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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explained that the Saucier procedural sequence, although “often beneficial” to
“prevent constitutional stagnation,” in some cases could “result[] in a substantial
expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions,” including “cases
in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far
from obvious whether in fact there is such a right. District courts and courts of
appeals with heavy caseloads are often understandably unenthusiastic about
what may seem to be an essentially academic exercise.”94 Hence, the Court held
that judges “should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”95 To help guide
that “sound discretion,” moreover, the Court announced factors that counsel in
favor96 and against97 deciding a constitutional question.
Since Pearson, the Court has repeatedly exercised this discretion, sometimes
opting to decide the constitutional question98 and sometimes not.99 In short, the
Court believes that discretion in qualified immunity cases will not lead to undue
constitutional stagnation, but will enable a better judicial process. The Court is
mindful of constitutional atrophy, but also recognizes that there are categories
of cases in which it is imprudent to clarify constitutional law. The intended
purpose of this new discretion is thus to strike the best balance between those
interests.

94

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236–37 (2009).
Id. at 236.
96 The factors in favor of deciding a constitutional question include whether: (1) “there would be little if
any conservation of judicial resources” in not deciding it; (2) it would “be difficult to decide whether a right is
clearly established without deciding precisely what the existing constitutional right happens to be”; (3) the “twostep procedure” would “promote[] the development of constitutional precedent”; and (4) the question is not one
that “frequently arise[s] in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.” Id.
97 The factors against deciding a constitutional question include whether: (1) doing so would result in
“substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources”; (2) “it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly
established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right”; (3) the court has a “heavy caseload[]”;
(4) additional “litigation of constitutional issues [would] waste[] the parties’ resources”; (5) the “question is so
factbound that the decision provides little guidance for future cases”; (6) “the question will soon be decided by
a higher court”; (7) “an uncertain interpretation of state law” is involved; (8) “‘the parties have provided very
few facts to define and limit any holding’ on the constitutional question”; (9) “the briefing of constitutional
questions is woefully inadequate”; (10) it would be “hard for affected parties to obtain appellate review of
constitutional decisions that may have a serious prospective effect on their operations”; and (11) in a particular
case, “constitutional avoidance” is unusually important. Id. at 236–42.
98 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014).
99 See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015) (declining to exercise Pearson
discretion because the constitutional briefing was inadequate).
95
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C. Unpublished Qualified Immunity Decisions
The story of the Court’s substantive decision in Harlow and its procedural
evolution from Saucier to Pearson has been told before. There is another
discretionary feature of modern litigation, however, that plays an important role
in qualified immunity cases that has not yet received enough attention:
unpublished decisions. In deciding cases governed by qualified immunity,
judges not only exercise discretion whether to reach the merits of constitutional
claims, but they also exercise discretion whether to “publish” their opinions, i.e.,
give them precedential effect on future panels.100 “Unpublished” opinions, like
published ones, are publicly available.101 But unlike published opinions, they do
not carry the same weight in our common law system of precedent.102
This discretionary power not to publish a decision, moreover, is especially
critical for qualified immunity because the substantive test for immunity turns
on whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of its violation.
This means it matters how a right becomes clearly established. Whether a past
opinion was designated as precedential can be key to that determination. The
debate over published versus unpublished opinions thus is especially relevant in
the context of constitutional torts. In this Article, we do not spell out the full
history of and controversies surrounding unpublished opinions; others have
plowed that ground.103 But it is important to briefly explain what these opinions
are and why they are important.
Federal circuit courts are common law courts in that their decisions generally
have precedential weight on other panels within the circuit.104 As Richard
100 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3978.10, at 382 (4th ed.
2008) (discussing unpublished opinions); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What
Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeal, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001) (discussing the
prevalence of unpublished opinions).
101 Epstein & King, supra note 39, at 107 n.335 (citing Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A
Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 220 (1999)).
102 See Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2155 n.3 (2015) (noting that unpublished opinions in some circuits
have “no precedential force”); Unpublished Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining
that an “unpublished opinion” generally “is considered binding only on the parties to the particular case in which
it is issued”).
103 See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 100, at § 3978.10, at 382–86 (discussing the history of court rules
allowing citation to unpublished opinions); Caleb E. Mason, An Aesthetic Defense of the Nonprecedential
Opinion: The Easy Cases Debate in the Wake of the 2007 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 55 UCLA L. REV. 643, 646 (2008) (collecting authorities relating to “[t]he jurisprudential, political,
equitable, ethical, and constitutional issues raised by the use of [unpublished opinions]” (footnotes omitted)).
104 See Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 755, 759 (2003).
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Cappalli has explained, traditionally “the court is obliged to decide under law,
which means that the court arrives at a principle of general application that it
would be willing to apply in future comparable cases. This decisional rule is
called the ‘rule of the case’ or ‘holding of the case.’”105 Once a holding has been
reached, the doctrine of stare decisis applies, meaning that the court’s
“decisional rule, whether implicit or express, is to be applied in future cases . . .
with comparable facts even if a later . . . court is dissatisfied with the rule.”106
Indeed, “the most important characteristic of a collegial appellate court is careful
attention, respect, and adherence to precedent.”107
In a perfect world, every appellate panel would write a detailed opinion in
every case. Such a well-explained opinion could then operate with stare decisis
force on all subsequent cases raising the same issue. Unfortunately, in our
imperfect world, “[a]ppellate judges continue to labor under the weight of tens
of thousands of appeals every year,” many of which do not raise novel
questions.108 Indeed, “[a] large proportion of the opinions that have been coming
out of American courts add essentially nothing to the corpus of the law. They
are of interest and significance to the parties only.”109 It would impose a real
burden on the judiciary if circuit courts were required to write full opinions on
the tens of thousands of cases filed each year.110
To deal with this problem, federal appellate courts, primarily in the 1960s
and 1970s, began experimenting with “unpublished opinions” that could be used
to dispose of appeals quickly. These unpublished opinions often lacked a full
articulation of the facts of the case and all the relevant legal principles, and
would not receive ordinary precedential effect on future panels. As the Federal
Judicial Center explained in 1973, “the judicial time and effort essential for the
development of an opinion to be published for posterity and widely distributed
is necessarily greater than that sufficient to enable the judge to provide a
statement so that the parties can understand the reasons for the decision.”111
Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure now recognize that

105

Id. at 761 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 762.
107 UC Health v. NLRB, 803 F.3d 669, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
108 Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 177–78 (1999).
109 Id. at 178 (quoting PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 35 (1976)).
110 See Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909,
927 (1986) (noting “the absurdity of destroying forests to distribute masses of prolix and repetitious material”).
111 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, FJC RESEARCH SERIES NO. 73-2, STANDARDS FOR
PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 3 (1973).
106
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circuit courts may allow panels to designate opinions as “unpublished,” “not for
publication,” “non-precedential,” “or the like.”112
Since the 1970s, each circuit has developed a scheme for issuing such
opinions.113 Today, moreover, the overwhelming majority of circuit court
decisions are unpublished,114 though there are different percentages across the
circuits.115 Although the circuits have always considered somewhat different
factors when deciding whether to publish an opinion,116 they often boil down to
whether publication would be in the “public interest”—a highly discretionary
standard.117
Whether unpublished decisions are good policy is a difficult question. On
one hand, imagine a lawsuit where the law is clear and it is impossible to imagine
how the case’s resolution could be relevant to any other parties in any other
cases.118 In a case like that, it makes little sense to require busy judges to go
through the trouble of preparing a full opinion of the sort that fills law school
casebooks.119 Suffice it to say, many cases do not raise novel issues.120

112

See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
Martin, supra note 108, at 184–85.
114 See Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 L. LIBR. J. 475, 478
(2004) (noting that about 80% of appellate decisions are unpublished).
115 See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit
Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 361–64 (2011).
116 See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1176
(1978).
117 See Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(discussing Fourth Circuit standards for publication, one of which is whether the case “involve[s] a legal issue
of continuing public interest”); Epstein & King, supra note 39, at 107 & nn.335–36 (explaining that while judges
should publish “opinions that are ‘of general precedential value,’” in practice the standard “is sufficiently vague
to permit circuit court judges to publish or not as they see fit”).
118 See, e.g., Mahogany v. La. State Supreme Court, 262 Fed. App’x 636, 637 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Just as one
cannot sue . . . the color teal, the number thirteen, or the weather, a complaint filed against a statute fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.”).
119 See Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This!: Why We Don’t Allow Citation to
Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43 (“After carefully reviewing the briefs and record, we
can succinctly explain who won, who lost, and why. We need not state the facts, as the parties already know
them; nor need we announce a rule general enough to apply to future cases.”).
120 See, e.g., Hurt v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 544 F.3d 308, 308–09 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In just the last couple of
years, Hurt has sued the Declaration of Independence, Black’s Law Dictionary, the United Nations, agencies of
the District of Columbia and the Federal Government, and various courts and their officers. Hurt has claimed
the existence of state supreme courts violates the Eighth Amendment, requested the Secret Service and the
President’s Cabinet be declared unconstitutional, and demanded the deportation of a Spanish-speaking
government employee. Nor are the slights Hurt suffered mere glancing blows; he routinely demands trillions of
dollars in damages.” (citations omitted)) (listing forty-four dockets).
113
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On the other hand, unpublished opinions may have downsides: the common
law method depends, in large part, on there being precedential cases to cite.121
Fewer published opinions may lead to less law articulation. Indeed, discomfort
with unpublished opinions prompted reform in 2006.122 Building on a
recommendation of then-Judge Samuel Alito (who chaired the Federal Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure),123 the Federal Rules
now make clear that although courts can continue to issue nonprecedential,
unpublished opinions, they “may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions . . . .”124 This
is a compromise; some advocated that unpublished opinions be abolished as
contrary to common law principles, whereas others urged that the status quo be
retained.125 The current Federal Rules split the difference while preserving the
discretionary power of courts to issue opinions without precedential effect.126
The similarity between the discretion to issue unpublished opinions and the
discretion not to resolve constitutional questions in qualified immunity cases is
obvious. In both situations, the Court realizes that there are competing values
and innumerable fact-specific circumstances in which those values must be
reconciled. When it comes to unpublished opinions, for instance, one value is
that the public benefits from precedential, well-articulated opinions, while
another value is preventing judges from being overloaded by writing full
opinions in cases that do not present sufficiently novel legal questions. The same
sorts of values apply in qualified immunity cases, where courts must balance the
need to prevent constitutional stagnation against the reality that some cases are
simply not good vehicles to clearly establish new constitutional rules.
Accordingly, federal appellate courts are given discretion to determine—based
on the particular characteristics of the case before them—whether it is in the
public interest that an opinion be published, just as they are given discretion to
leapfrog merits questions in some qualified immunity cases, again depending on
the particular circumstances of the case before them.

121

Cappalli, supra note 104, at 759.
See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 & advisory committee’s notes.
123 Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm und Drang over the Citation of
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1444–45 (2005).
124 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
125 See Schiltz, supra note 123, at 1470, 1475.
126 Id. at 1473 (“[T]he Advisory Committee Note to Rule 32.1 went out of its way to be clear that the rule
did not forbid any court to issue an unpublished opinion, dictate the circumstances under which a court may
choose to designate an opinion as unpublished, or imply anything about what effect a court must give to one of
its unpublished opinions.”).
122

NIELSON_WALKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

76

9/26/2016 8:37 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:55

For the reasons explained above, whether an opinion is published is
especially important in the context of qualified immunity. Liability depends on
whether a right was clearly established, meaning it matters a great deal whether
an unpublished opinion can clearly establish a federal right. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has never definitively declared what weight, if any, should be
given to unpublished opinions in determining whether a right is clearly
established. Many circuits hold, however, that unpublished decisions cannot be
used to show that an asserted right is clearly established, or, at a minimum, that
they are of little value in making that showing.127 And even in circuits that
purport to consider unpublished opinions in determining whether a right is
clearly established,128 such opinions no doubt carry less weight, at least de facto,
since there often is little to no analysis in them. Because whether immunity
applies is highly fact-dependent,129 it follows that unpublished opinions that do
not provide the facts necessarily are less able to clearly establish the law.130
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE DANGER OF DISCRETION
It is useful to contrast the Supreme Court’s embrace of judicial discretion in
qualified immunity cases with how it views administrative discretion in
regulatory cases. When it comes to agency discretion, judges and scholars often
fear that flexibility may be put to arbitrary ends.131 Especially relevant here,
many worry about “strategic” behavior by agencies, fearing that agencies may
use the discretion intended for certain public ends to instead accomplish private
ends that benefit the agency.132 In fact, from the Administrative Procedure Act

127 See David R. Cleveland, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain Precedential Status of Unpublished Opinions
Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45, 64 (2010) (“[C]ourts have taken radically
different interpretations of what sources may clearly establish the law.”).
128 See id. at 71–74 (describing the Ninth Circuit as the one circuit that “has unequivocally stated a
willingness to use unpublished opinions” to show clearly established law, and the Third and Sixth Circuits as
“seem[ing] to allow the use of unpublished opinions in clearly establishing the law”).
129 See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015) (rejecting the application of
legal principles at a high level of abstraction).
130 Cf. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 244 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[S]uch orders, being summary, frequently do
not set out the factual background of the case in enough detail to disclose whether its facts are sufficiently similar
to those of a subsequent unrelated case to make our summary ruling applicable to the new case.”).
131 See, e.g., David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2188–89 (2010).
132 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A
Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 913 (1994) (“[O]ver time, all bureaucracies will
substitute private, bureaucratic objectives for the public objectives that characterized their origination.” (citing
ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967))).
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(APA)133 to White House review134 to foundational doctrines like the duty of
contemporaneous explanation established by SEC v. Chenery Corp.,135 much of
administrative law as we know it is addressed toward “the dangers associated
with the exercise of discretion.”136 Yet when it comes to judicial discretion, at
least in this context, such wariness is absent.
A. The Value and Danger of Administrative Discretion
Why is discretion so central to administrative law? Because it is both useful
and slippery. In a world in which anything can happen, it is challenging for
legislatures to craft rules that make sense in all applications. Even a dutiful
legislator often will fail to envision idiosyncratic situations.137 It is also difficult
to predict all the ways that innovative actors may engage in troublesome
behavior, especially because behavior is dynamic, changing in response to
enforcement. It thus can be attractive to regulate consequences, rather than
actions.138 So what can legislatures do?
Often, the answer is to bestow discretion on some delegate.139 Discretion is
valuable because it allows for individualized treatment and can be targeted
toward consequences rather than specific actions. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court proclaimed in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States that

133

See Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 243–44 (2014)
(explaining that in 1946, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee “proclaimed that the APA ‘cut down the
“cult of discretion” so far as federal law is concerned’” (quoting George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1666 (1996))).
134 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1838, 1845–46 (2013) (discussing OIRA review).
135 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943); see also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE
L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (explaining that Chenery helps “prevent arbitrariness in the agency’s exercise of its
discretion”).
136 Barkow, supra note 3, at 1334.
137 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469,
472 n.8 (1986) (“Rules alone, untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern
government and of modern justice.” (quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25
(1969))).
138 See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988) (“The term ‘restraint of
trade’ in the statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a particular
economic consequence, which may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in varying times and
circumstances.”).
139 The delegate, of course, need not be an agency; it can very well be, and often is, a court. See Lemos,
supra note 8, at 429; cf. Shaw, supra note 2, at 669 (“[D]iscretion is a necessary component of any legal system,
because society’s ability to regulate the future is inherently limited by imperfect information and an imperfect
understanding of aims.”).
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“discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process.”140 This pro-discretion
view—associated with New Dealers like James Landis141—was key to the
creation of much of the modern administrative state.142
Unfortunately, discretion comes at a cost, as New Deal excesses came to
show.143 The very flexibility that allows for individualization and adaptation can
be used in arbitrary, biased, or self-interested ways.144 For instance, in terms of
strategic behavior, an agency may use discretion to “shirk” unpleasant duties145
or to expand its authority to gain increased rents from regulated parties. An
example of this is the worry that agency officials may be tempted to increase
regulatory complexity so that their bureaucratic knowledge will become more
valuable—and lucrative—for later private sector work.146 Hence, “lifeblood” or
not, the Supreme Court in Burlington Truck Lines also warned that “unless we
make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise,
the strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no
practical limits . . . .”147 After all, “[a]bsolute discretion, like corruption, marks
the beginning of the end of liberty.”148
So here is the central dilemma of administrative law: How to gain the
benefits of discretion without surrendering “rule of law” values like legitimacy,

140 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962); see also Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463,
463–64 (2012) (defending this view of administrative law and “the legitimacy of administrative discretion”).
141 Aaron L. Nielson, Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49 GA. L. REv 757, 768–69 (2015) (citing
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 70 (1966)).
142 See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2261 (explaining that Landis thought that expertise could “solv[e] the
problem of administrative discretion”).
143 See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–37, 41 (1950) (recognizing the “evils” associated
with the “[m]ultiplication of federal administrative agencies and expansion of their functions” over the preceding
“past half-century”); Kagan, supra note 1, at 2261 (“[Landis’s] idea today seems almost quaint, and even then
it provoked strong opposition.”); Shaw, supra note 2, at 668 (“The problem of discretion became more pressing
after the New Deal.”).
144 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1563 (1992) (“[R]egulators will often pursue their own private interests. This pursuit partially explains
the failure of the New Deal agency model, which naively assumed that regulators would diligently implement
statutory goals.”).
145 Id.
146 See id. at 1564 (“In addition to shirking, officials’ self-interest also creates incentives for them to
augment their regulatory authority. Greater power allows regulators to increase monopoly rents, which they can
then trade to interest groups in return for personal benefits such as future jobs or freedom from criticism.”
(footnotes omitted)).
147 Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (quoting New York v. United
States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
148 New York, 342 U.S. at 884 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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consistency, and public spiritedness?149 For over a century, that question has
dogged the field. In the United States, unchecked discretion arguably reached its
zenith during the New Deal, which prompted a recalibration. The resulting
“fierce compromise” was the APA,150 which accepted discretion’s utility but
also recognized it can be “put to arbitrary and biased use.”151
B. Administrative Law’s Meta Cost-Benefit Approach
To mitigate the dangers of discretion without snuffing it out altogether,
administrative law has developed a “meta” cost-benefit analysis. Agencies are
given a great deal of flexibility, but often those same agencies must learn to work
within safeguards that “inherently diminish the discretion and flexibility of
government officials. Indeed, that is exactly what [they are] designed to do.”152
In other words, because discretion is both valuable and dangerous, balances
must be struck, depending on whether a particular type of discretion is valuable
enough to outweigh the dangers associated with it and, if not, whether costjustified safeguards can be crafted to mitigate the danger.
All of this is to say that context matters; not all discretion is created equal.
For instance, an agency’s choice not to employ notice-and-comment rulemaking
when reinterpreting a regulation through an interpretative rule153 is very different
from discretion “to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise
a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’”154
Similarly, because prisons can be hostile, wardens have latitude to set and
enforce prison policies. But despite prison dangers, no one thinks a warden’s
discretion should be limitless.155

149 See Shaw, supra note 2, at 668 (“Rule by arbitrary choice is not rule by law, and thus the lasting legacy
of legal realism became a challenge: explain how legal indeterminacy can be reconciled with the rule of law.”).
150 Shepherd, supra note 133, at 1557, 1681.
151 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37 (1950).
152 John H. Jackson, Perspective on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal
Procedures in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1578–79 (1984); see also Shapiro et al., supra note
140, at 464 (“[P]rocedure after procedure has been added in a vain effort to eliminate discretion.”).
153 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203–04 (2015) (upholding discretion without
notice-and-comment procedures).
154 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (discussing unanimous rejection of
substantive policy-making discretion as unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935)).
155 See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015) (“We readily agree that the Department has a
compelling interest in staunching the flow of contraband into and within its facilities, but the argument that this
interest would be seriously compromised by allowing an inmate to grow a ½-inch beard is hard to take
seriously.”).
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To be sure, the costs of safeguards can exceed their value. This is often true
if a generalist judge is the safeguard. For instance, some discretionary acts—like
an agency decision not to bring an enforcement action—are effectively not
reviewable at all.156 Why? Because, on one hand, not enforcing the law is
thought to be less a threat to liberty than enforcing the law in an arbitrary way,157
and because, on the other hand, judges are poorly equipped to prioritize the
competing resource demands that an agency faces.158 The dangers of discretion
in this context, thus, are not deemed weighty enough to justify the costs of a
safeguard to constrain that discretion. Similarly, in informal rulemaking, an
agency effectively has absolute discretion to provide procedural protections
greater than the baseline requirements of the APA.159 This makes sense; the
danger that agencies will choose to provide too many procedural protections—
and so incur greater burdens for themselves—seems remote.
Other sorts of decisions, however, are reviewed with greater skepticism—
particularly where the costs of discretion are substantial. For instance, agencies
have a great deal of discretion about the content of legislative rules, but they
generally do not have discretion to promulgate such rules with retroactive
effect.160 The power to regulate retroactively is often too dangerous for agencies
to wield because the threat of upsetting expectations is real while the benefits of
rulemaking usually can be obtained through prospective rules.161
Similarly, “hard look” review—which, again, generally applies when an
agency has exercised discretion in formulating final agency action—requires
that “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.’”162 This safeguard reflects the realization that
policymaking is valuable, but the more power an agency has over policy, the
more hazardous it may become. Rather than forbid such discretion—and so lose
the good—the Supreme Court crafted a safeguard for it: hard-look review.
156

See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
See id. at 832 (“[W]hen an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over
an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon
to protect.”).
158 See id. at 831–32 (“The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”).
159 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544–45 (1978).
160 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
161 See id. (“The power to require readjustments for the past is drastic.” (quoting Brimstone R.R. & Canal
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 104, 122 (1928))).
162 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
157
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C. The Supreme Court’s Concerns About Agency Discretion
The Supreme Court is not blind to the fact that agencies can lose their way.
In the real world, the Justices recognize that bureaucrats are not always
technocratic; like anyone else, they make mistakes. Thus, despite discretion’s
utility, caution is sometimes called for.
Precedent reflects this reality. For instance, the Justices in recent years have
reiterated that agency action is presumptively reviewable. A good example is
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, decided last year by the unanimous Court.163
There, the question was whether the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) pre-suit conciliation efforts were subject to judicial
review.164 The agency opposed such review.165 According to the statute, the
EEOC can bring suit whenever it “‘has been unable to secure from the
respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission’ itself.”166
Likewise, the statute forbids any evidence regarding conciliation efforts from
being introduced in court.167 From these textual clues, the EEOC argued that its
discretion was not reviewable. But Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, would
have none of it, concluding that “the Government takes its observation about
discretion too far.”168 The Court stressed that there must be a role for judicial
review. Otherwise, “the Commission’s compliance with the law would rest in
the Commission’s hands alone. We need not doubt the EEOC’s trustworthiness,
or its fidelity to law, to shy away from that result.”169
Similar discretion-wary analysis drove the Court’s 2012 decision in Sackett
v. EPA, which held—also unanimously—that a compliance order under the
Clean Water Act was subject to immediate judicial review.170 The Sackett
Court’s skepticism of discretion in this context was palpable. As Justice Scalia
explained, “[t]he APA’s presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the
163

135 S. Ct. 1645, 1652 (2015).
Id. at 1649.
165 Id. at 1650.
166 Id. at 1649 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1)).
167 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b)).
168 Id. at 1652.
169 Id. at 1652–53; see also id. (“We need only know—and know that Congress knows—that legal lapses
and violations occur, and especially so when they have no consequence.”); EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc., 746
F.3d 145, 155–56 (4th Cir. 2014) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (explaining that to avoid encouraging “sub-optimal
agency behavior,” judges must remember the “danger that those inside a public bureaucracy, armed with
significant resources, authority, and discretion, may become gradually numb as to how their actions affect those
outside” the agency).
170 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
164

NIELSON_WALKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

82

9/26/2016 8:37 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:55

principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all. And there is no reason to
think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strongarming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity
for judicial review . . . .”171 Justice Alito, writing separately, went further: “The
position taken in this case by the Federal Government—a position that the Court
now squarely rejects—would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans
entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency . . . employees.”172
The Court adopted a similar analysis in Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.
in 2016.173
Sometimes, moreover, the Court does question an agency’s trustworthiness.
Rhetoric surrounding Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. deference is a good
example. Seminole Rock commands courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation
of its own ambiguous regulations.174 Although this sounds innocent enough, in
recent years it has been attacked—repeatedly—on the ground that it creates
incentives for agencies to use their discretion in nefarious ways.175 Indeed, a
majority opinion of the Court, while noting the “advantages” of such deference,
has stressed the “risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended
regulations that they can later interpret as they see fit.”176 In other words, the
Justices do not always trust that agencies, left to their own devices, will
unfailingly use discretion for the public good.
III. STRATEGIC IMMUNITY: A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION
The Supreme Court’s increasingly sophisticated view of discretion is
nowhere to be found when it comes to qualified immunity. Yet judges, like
agency officials, may also use their discretion in suboptimal ways. As Judge
Richard Arnold reminded us, judges are “human” too.177 The Court’s
presumptive wariness of bureaucratic discretion accordingly should extend to
judicial discretion, at least in this context. Indeed, given the Court’s supervisory
powers over the lower federal courts, which it does not have over administrative
171

Id.
Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
173 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1816 (2016) (holding that jurisdictional determinations are also subject to immediate
review).
174 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
175 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210–13, 1217–20 (2015) (separate opinions
of Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, J.J.); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 1339–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012).
177 Arnold, supra note 101, at 223.
172
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agencies, it makes sense for the Court to be especially conscious of the costs and
benefits of discretion when it comes to the procedures used by judges. After all,
unlike agency discretion where the Justices must live—more or less—within the
confines of the APA,178 when it comes to the federal bench, the Supreme Court
has a freer hand.179
In this Part, we set out the theoretical risks posed by qualified immunity’s
procedural discretion, especially when combined with discretion not to publish
a decision. Our point is not that discretion is a bad thing or that it should be done
away with. To the contrary, discretion is valuable and undoubtedly is often used
well. But even valuable tools can be abused. To see why, it is helpful to
understand just how complex qualified immunity can be, and how that
complexity creates opportunities for strategic behavior. To illustrate, this Part
begins with a simple example of a qualified immunity case.
A. An Example: How Does a Judge Vote?
Imagine a morning in Ohio. A family is preparing to send a child to school.
All of a sudden, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) task force surrounds the
home. Agents suspect a member of the family—the father—has information
about a fugitive. But they have no warrant to arrest him or search the home, and
the circumstances are not exigent. The agents pound on the door and threaten
that unless the family lets them in, the father will go to jail. The agents then enter
without permission, but no one orders them to leave. Afterwards, the family sues
the agents for violating the Fourth Amendment by breaching the curtilage of
their property and entering their home. The agents rejoin that they were allowed
to approach as they did and that they had consent to enter because the father
began opening the door, and no one told them to get out.

178 But see Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293,
1293, 1295 (2012) (“[M]uch of administrative law is really administrative common law, [though] statutes exert
some constraining force on judicial creativity.”).
179 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“The law in this area is clear. This Court
has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence
and procedure that are binding in those tribunals.”); see also JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT:
SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 148–49 (2009) (explaining that
constitutional structure suggests the Court has a supreme or supervisory role over the lower courts); Tara Leigh
Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing that the vertical
structure of the judiciary “preserve[s] [the] ‘supreme’ role” of the Court). But see Amy Coney Barrett, The
Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 360–66 (2006) (casting some doubt on this
power).
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Now imagine you are a judge on the Sixth Circuit confronted with this fact
pattern. You have just heard oral argument. After studying the relevant Fourth
Amendment cases and principles, you believe that you know the answer to the
constitutional questions. How do you vote?
This question might appear to be straightforward, especially under the simple
rule from Saucier. If you conclude that the officers violated the Constitution as
to both claims—the curtilage claim and the entry claim—you would first hold
that the Constitution was violated, and then you would decide whether the rights
were clearly established. If, however, you conclude that only one claim is
constitutionally cognizable, then you would vote to recognize that claim, state
that the other claim is meritless, and then vote on whether the right violated was
clearly established. And if you conclude that neither claim actually states a
constitutional right, you would vote to dismiss both on the merits. In other
words, one of these options would reflect your vote:
Voting Options Under the Rule from Saucier
(1) The agents violated the Constitution as to both claims. Each right was clearly established.
(2) The agents violated the Constitution as to the curtilage claim but not the entry claim. That
right was clearly established.
(3) The agents violated the Constitution as to the curtilage claim but not the entry claim. That
right was not clearly established.
(4) The agents violated the Constitution as to the entry claim but not the curtilage claim. That
right was clearly established.
(5) The agents violated the Constitution as to the entry claim but not the curtilage claim. That
right was not clearly established.
(6) The agents did not violate the Constitution as to either claim.
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Pearson, however, adds a layer of complexity by allowing lower courts to
exercise discretion whether to follow the Saucier sequence.180 Thus under
Pearson, you would have to decide whether to resolve the constitutional
question, at least in some scenarios.181 This would lead to one of the following
votes:
Voting Options Under the Rule from Pearson
(1) The agents violated the Constitution as to both claims. Each right was clearly established.
(2) The agents violated the Constitution as to the curtilage claim only. That right was clearly
established. The entry claim was not clearly established, and the court should not resolve it.
(3) The agents violated the Constitution as to the curtilage claim only. That right was clearly
established. The entry claim was not clearly established, but the court should nonetheless
resolve it by declaring that the entry claim also states a constitutional violation.
(4) The agents violated the Constitution as to the curtilage claim only. That right was clearly
established. The entry claim was not clearly established, but the court should nonetheless
resolve it by declaring that the entry claim does not state a constitutional violation.
(5) The agents violated the Constitution as to the entry claim only. That right was clearly
established. The curtilage claim was not clearly established, and the court should not resolve
it.
(6) The agents violated the Constitution as to the entry claim only. That right was clearly
established. The curtilage claim was not clearly established, but the court should nonetheless
resolve it by declaring that the curtilage claim also states a constitutional violation.
(7) The agents violated the Constitution as to the entry claim only. That right was clearly
established. The curtilage claim was not clearly established, but the court should nonetheless
resolve it by declaring that the curtilage claim does not state a constitutional violation.
(8) Neither claim was clearly established and neither should be resolved.
(9) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve the curtilage
claim by declaring that it states a constitutional violation. It should not resolve the entry claim.
(10) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve the curtilage
claim by declaring that it does not state a constitutional violation. It should not resolve the
entry claim.
(11) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve the entry
claim by declaring that it states a constitutional violation. It should not resolve the curtilage
claim.

180
181

555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
See id. at 236–37.
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(12) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve the entry
claim by declaring that it does not state a constitutional violation. It should not resolve the
curtilage claim.
(13) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve both claims
by declaring that both state a constitutional violation.
(14) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve both claims
by declaring that the curtilage claim states a constitutional violation but the entry claim does
not.
(15) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve both claims
by declaring that the entry claim states a constitutional violation but the curtilage claim does
not.
(16) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve both claims
by declaring that neither states a constitutional violation.

The situation, however, is more complicated still because neither Saucier nor
Pearson considered an additional discretionary question: should the opinion be
published? That question at least doubles the number of potential outcomes.182
Sample Voting Options Under the Rule from Pearson with Publication Decision
(1) The agents violated the Constitution as to both claims. Each right was clearly
established. The opinion should be published.
(1′) The agents violated the Constitution as to both claims. Each right was clearly
established. The opinion should not be published.
….
(16) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve both
claims by declaring that neither states a constitutional violation. The opinion should be
published.
(16′) Neither claim was clearly established. The court should nonetheless resolve both
claims by declaring that neither states a constitutional violation. The opinion should not be
published.

Finally, on a multi-judge panel, there is at least one more level of complexity.
Not only must you decide what your preference is with all else being equal, but

182 It is possible to partially publish opinions. See, e.g., Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 527 F.3d 176,
180 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The Hospitals’ other arguments are sufficiently lacking in merit as not to warrant
consideration in a published opinion”). In theory then, a court could publish its resolution of one claim but not
of another.
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you must also decide what your preference is given the preferences of the other
voting members. For instance, if both of your colleagues believe that there is no
violation as to either claim, while you believe the opposite, perhaps you would
opt to vote your preferred outcome, even if it means writing a dissent (note,
however, that some judges join opinions they do not completely agree with,
especially if the vote will not make a difference183). But what if the difference
between views is not so stark? What if everyone agrees that the plaintiffs should
lose on both claims, but for different reasons? One judge is not sure whether the
rights exist but is confident neither was clearly established; another is sure that
the rights do not exist and so could not have been clearly established; and you
agree that neither right was clearly established but believe that both exist and,
moreover, that the panel should exercise its discretion under Pearson to clearly
establish those rights going forward. Each judge could, in theory, vote her own
way. Or the panel might simply say “not clearly established” and move on,
perhaps in an unpublished opinion.184
So how do you vote? The answer, of course, depends on how strongly you
prefer the “let’s use Pearson discretion to clearly establish these rights” option.
For instance, if it takes much effort to write separately, you may push the panel
towards an outcome you can live with, even if it is not your first preference.
This example illustrates how resolving these cases is complicated. The
Supreme Court’s simple model of qualified immunity is sound enough, as far as
it goes. No one should dispute that it makes more sense for a court to use its
discretion to decide a constitutional question if it is well briefed, important, and
unlikely to arise outside of the qualified immunity context than if it is poorly
briefed, idiosyncratic, and subject to another form of litigation.185 But as this
example illustrates, the lists of factors in Pearson do not capture the full range
of considerations that go through a judge’s mind. In the real world, things are
much more complicated.

183 Richard J. Lazarus, The Opinion Assignment Power, Justice Scalia’s Un-Becoming, and UARG’s
Unanticipated Cloud over the Clean Air Act, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 45 (2015) (“Justices must frequently
join final opinions even though they do not agree with every word or nuance.”).
184 See, e.g., Amy E. Sloan, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential
Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 946 n.308 (2008) (“[J]udges may join an opinion
when they agree with the result, even if they do not agree with the reasoning, when they know the opinion will
be nonprecedential.” (citing Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, Minutes of the Fall 2002 Meeting 36–37
(Nov. 18, 2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/appll02.pdf)).
185 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009).
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This particular illustration, for instance, is a stylized version of a real case:
Turk v. Comerford, decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2012.186 There, the threejudge panel concluded that the FBI’s entry violated clearly established law but
granted qualified immunity as to the curtilage claim without reaching the
constitutional question.187 The Sixth Circuit, however, made another decision.
Despite hearing oral argument and reversing much of the district court’s
judgment, the panel decided that its twenty-five-page opinion should be
unpublished.188 It is possible that that particular outcome was the preferred one
of all panel members. But it is also possible that the judges opted to use their
discretion to reach a result they all could live with. If so, was this compromise
socially optimal or, if the panel’s discretion had been constrained, could a
socially better result have emerged? Nothing the Supreme Court has said about
qualified immunity even begins to address these questions.
B. Considerations That May Affect How Circuit Court Judges Resolve
Qualified Immunity Cases
No one has perfectly mapped the utility function for circuit court judges.189
Indeed, there surely is no one such utility function. All judges are different.190
(The same, of course, could be said for agency officials.) Nonetheless, it is still
useful to think through the sorts of considerations that are likely to go through a
typical judge’s mind.
Our intuition is that judges try to “get the law right,” in that they apply
traditional legal principles to reach predictable results.191 But what other sorts of
considerations pass through the minds of circuit court judges deciding qualified
immunity cases? This Article does not offer a comprehensive list; the literature

186

488 Fed. App’x 933, 935 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id.
188 Id. at 948.
189 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 9, at 2484–85 (discussing the nuanced factors that must go into a correct
judicial utility function).
190 See, e.g., id. at 2489 (“Of course, the relative strength of legal and policy preferences could vary from
judge to judge.”).
191 Id.; see also Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 396 (2007) (“The theory
that judges single-mindedly pursue their policy preferences is incompatible with the numerous studies
concluding that judges shift the nature of their reasoning and the general trend of their decisions in response to
Supreme Court precedent.”); Alex Kozinski & Fred Bernstein, Clerkship Politics, 2 GREEN BAG 57, 59–60
(1998) (noting that ideology’s impact on decisionmaking is overstated).
187
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on judicial decisionmaking is expansive and conflicting.192 We do not wade too
deeply into this complex and growing field of scholarship.193 Instead, our
analysis is meant to be commonsensical. As a thought experiment, what seems
plausible? In thinking about how judges exercise their discretion in qualified
immunity cases, the following sorts of considerations seem like realistic
candidates.
1. Substantive Legal Outcomes. Few issues are more hotly contested than the
extent to which ideological preferences determine judicial behavior. In our
experience, models woefully miss the mark if they do not account for the fact
that judges in good faith try to follow the law. Indeed, as Larry Solum has noted,
a “purely ideological model does not fare well” in the real world.194 That said,
judges are not indifferent to the ideological outcomes of their decisions, even
though they are often willing to rule contrary to them.
2. Future Effects of Precedent. Judges also care about more than just the case
before them. In a common law system, they know that precedent matters. They
also know other judges will apply their precedent. Accordingly, even if a judge
believes she can properly apply a complex rule in the next case, she also knows
there is a real chance that whatever rule she crafts will be misapplied (from her
perspective) by others. After all, it is not uncommon for judges to apply a
precedent in a way that the precedent’s author did not intend.195 Hence, if a judge
is worried that others will misapply precedent, this may influence how an
opinion is written.
3. Prospects of Further Review. Aside from getting the law right, judges
worry about being reversed. While this concern is not the only motivation

192

See, e.g., Solum, supra note 9, at 2467 (discussing literature and critiquing LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013)).
193 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND
THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 2 (2011); FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
18 (2007); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical
Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995).
194 Solum, supra note 9, at 2487.
195 See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248–51 (2015)
(reading Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), more broadly than its author intended); Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (reading Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), more broadly
than its author intended); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947) (reading SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943), more narrowly than its author intended).
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driving behavior (it may not even be a strong one),196 it is hardly surprising that
judges, like anyone else, dislike having their reasoning rejected, especially if
reversal imposes reputational harm.197 Indeed, just as administrative agencies
may try to avoid having their handiwork second-guessed by courts, judges also
do not like being reversed.198
4. Collegiality. It is widely acknowledged that judges care about collegiality
on the bench.199 Again, judges are people. For many, it is unpleasant to disagree
with colleagues, especially if that disagreement requires more work, such as a
dissent.200 Accordingly, if it is possible for judges to reach a resolution that does
not spur animosity across the panel, that path may be attractive.
5. Public Reaction. Finally, there is reason to think that judges, as human
beings, enjoy praise and dislike criticism.201 Usually, this instinct is irrelevant to
adjudication because there is no public attention; the vast majority of cases
decided in circuit courts are relevant only to the parties. Judges do not need to
think twice about what a reporter is likely to think about most contract cases
because no reporter will ever think of it at all. But what if a decision will receive
public scrutiny? Allegations of police brutality, for instance, catch people’s
attention, especially today.

196 David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 597 (2003) (explaining with empirical support that fear of reversal cannot explain all
aspects of law compliance).
197 MARK HERRMANN, THE CURMUDGEON’S GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW 4 (2006) (“Judges do not like to
be reversed. Accordingly, if a precedent contains the implicit threat of reversal, I will use that threat (gently, of
course) when I discuss that case.”); Nou, supra note 9, at 1771–72 (explaining, in the context of district courts,
that reversals impose “reputational costs”) (collecting authorities).
198 Nou, supra note 9, at 1756 (analogizing agencies and courts).
199 See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A
COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 112 (2006).
200 See Frank B. Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 1399–1400 (2009)
(“Collegiality and ideology inevitably conflict. Given the range of ideological preferences and political ‘hot
button’ issues facing courts today, one would expect judges to disagree about the resolution of certain legal
issues. Because such disagreement puts collegiality and individuality in conflict, any model of judicial
decisionmaking must account for the interaction of these potentially opposing factors.” (footnote omitted));
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (discussing the effect of a “whistleblower” on the
court); Solum, supra note 9, at 2471 (“[D]issents will be more likely when the ideological stakes are high,
because writing dissents may entail collegiality costs and always involves an effort cost . . . .”).
201 See Aaron L. Nielson, Reflections on the End of the Federal Law Clerk Hiring Plan, 112 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 27 (2013) (explaining the “human nature” of judges).
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C. Theoretical Risks of Judicial Discretion
When all of these factors are considered, there is a risk that judges may use
their discretion in qualified immunity cases in ways that are, from the public’s
perspective, suboptimal. Indeed, they may use discretion in self-serving ways—
for instance, by maximizing private advantage.
To be clear, by using the word “strategic,” we do not cast aspersions on the
good faith of judges.202 No doubt almost all judges always try to do their best.
The same is true for agency officials. Even so, incentives matter, and, in any
event, “the standard set for men of good will is even more useful to the venal.”203
Humans are tempted to act in self-interested ways and can, in complete good
faith, rationalize away self-interested behavior.204 Just as agency officials may
come to believe that self-interested acts are, in fact, public-spirited, judges may
come to believe that what is good for the bench is good for the bar. That reality
may lead to the following types of suboptimal outcomes, which can be grouped
into two broad categories.
1. Strategic (Non)Use of Pearson Discretion
An obvious danger is that judges may use their discretion to decline to clarify
law when they should clarify it. Imagine a case that would be an ideal candidate
for clarifying constitutional law per the Pearson factors: a case in which the
constitutional question, although not clearly established, is well briefed,
important, and unlikely to arise outside of the qualified immunity context.205
Although the plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed, the panel should nevertheless
resolve the constitutional question to provide clarity to the public. After all,
applying Pearson’s weighing of the costs and benefits, clarification in a case
like this would be the socially-optimal outcome.
But imagine further that the case also involves a controversial question, and
the panel is not ideologically homogeneous. If the panel was forced to reach the
merits, the law would be clarified (in one direction or the other), but not without
prompting a fierce dissent. In such a scenario, it is not unthinkable that the panel
might opt simply to dismiss the claim as not clearly established and say nothing
202

Cf. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1652 (2015) (explaining that the Court “need not
doubt the EEOC’s trustworthiness” to worry about discretion).
203 New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
204 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 101, at 223 (noting even good-faith self-deception).
205 See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (exercising Pearson discretion because those
qualities existed).
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more, in effect trading the public good of constitutional clarity for the private
benefit of better collegiality. Likewise, if the issue is controversial, the panel
may fear reversal. One way to minimize that chance would be not to reach the
constitutional merits. By deciding an issue relevant only in a particular case (e.g.,
the claim was not clearly established), as opposed to announcing a constitutional
principle of broad application, the decision would be less certworthy.206
The inverse is also true. There may be cases in which doctrine should not be
clarified, even if discretion exists to do so. For instance, imagine a case in which
the constitutional question is not well briefed,207 and is likely to arise outside of
the qualified immunity context, yet is important enough for the panel to care
about. Applying Pearson, the panel should not resolve the constitutional
question.208 Nonetheless, if a judge were to think, “well, you know, we have a
pretty good panel,” he may press to resolve the constitutional question once and
for all. Such a judge would be trading a sound judicial process, which benefits
the public, for an ideologically pleasing result from the perspective of the panel.
Such a result seems contrary to how the public—and the Supreme Court—would
wish cases to be adjudicated.
2. Strategic (Non)Publication of Immunity Decisions
Judges also might decide not to publish a decision that, from the public’s
perspective, should be published. Again, imagine a case that should result in an
opinion, per Pearson, that clarifies the law going forward. Yet also imagine that
the panel is split on the merits and deciding them in a published opinion that sets
the law for the circuit would prompt animosity. One can imagine judges opting
to go along with an opinion going one way or the other so long as it is not
published.
The idea that judges may use their publication discretion in socially
suboptimal ways is not new. Judge Patricia Wald, formerly of the D.C. Circuit,
has observed that this discretion “allows for deviousness and abuse. I have seen
judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision incorporating an
agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming public debate about what

206 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists
of . . . misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”).
207 Cf. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (noting poor briefing).
208 Id. (explaining that although the Court has discretion to decide unbriefed constitutional questions, it is
not prudent to do so).
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law controls.”209 Moreover, Judge Wald noted that she had “even seen wily
would-be dissenters go along with a result they do not like so long as it is not
elevated to a precedent.”210 Judge Arnold, formerly of the Eighth Circuit, made
a similar observation.211 And Justice Clarence Thomas—no novice when it
comes to reading circuit court decisions—has suggested the same. Dissenting
from the Court’s denial of certiorari, he included this forceful attack:
True enough, the decision below is unpublished and therefore lacks
precedential force in the Fourth Circuit. But that in itself is yet another
disturbing aspect of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, and yet another
reason to grant review. The Court of Appeals had full briefing and
argument on Austin’s claim of judicial vindictiveness. It analyzed the
claim in a 39-page opinion written over a dissent. By any standard—
and certainly by the Fourth Circuit’s own—this decision should have
been published. . . . It is hard to imagine a reason that the Court of
Appeals would not have published this opinion except to avoid
creating binding law for the Circuit.212

Scholars too have observed that judges may “make strategic use of their
discretion—publishing opinions that follow Supreme Court precedent . . . and
failing to publish those opinions that do not, with the goal of avoiding
reversal.”213 The worry is that unpublished opinions “allow courts to engage in
ad hoc decision-making and avoid accountability for so doing,” for instance, by
further insulating their decision from review or backtracking from precedent.214
Indeed, one study showed that “judges made a higher percentage of decisions
that agreed with their ideological preferences in published opinions, and a higher
percentage of decisions that disagreed with their ideological preferences in
209 Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1371, 1374 (1995).
210 Id.
211 Arnold, supra note 101, at 223 (noting the risk that judges who cannot distinguish a case may opt for
“an abbreviated, unpublished opinion, and no one will ever be the wiser”).
212 Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(citations omitted).
213 Epstein & King, supra note 39, at 108 (footnote omitted).
214 David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished
Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1680 (2005). Of course, even if unpublished opinions are not used
strategically, they may still be problematic. See, e.g., Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished
Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 735 (2006) (arguing that
judges do not know whether an opinion will be important); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The
Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1484 (2004) (“Even if there were no
credible evidence of misconduct or structural inequality in the operation of unpublication, the lack of
transparency it produces would damage the legitimacy of the judicial system . . . .”). But there are benefits too.
The issue is whether the costs outweigh the benefits.
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unpublished opinions,” though finding no evidence that “judges exploit
nonpublication to hide ideologically-driven decisions.”215 While some question
whether judges hide decisions,216 many believe that at least some strategic use
of unpublished opinions occurs.217
All of these strategic dangers are especially potent when it comes to qualified
immunity because damages are only possible for “clearly established” law. To
be clearly established, an earlier case does not need to be factually identical to
the subsequent case—indeed, that is impossible.218 There thus is a sort of
penumbral effect around cases that find violations of clearly established rights;
those cases clearly establish the law for closely related contexts too. It follows
that if a judge wants to clearly establish more law going forward, she could write
a broad, published opinion. By contrast, if a judge worries about clearly
establishing law, she could write a narrow, unpublished opinion.
Finally, some decisions arguably should be unpublished. For instance, if the
law was already clearly established, a decision applying that clearly established
law may serve no function going forward for the public. If the panel spends too
much time on such a decision—for instance, to “make a point”—it is possible
that other work may be shortchanged. Likewise, because precedent has
penumbral effects, especially in this context, publishing an opinion may chill
behavior because regulated parties are unsure whether a related but arguably
distinct practice is covered by the published decision.
* * *
For all these reasons and others, there is a risk that discretion in qualified
immunity cases sometimes may be put to strategic ends. We do not argue that
this happens all or even most of the time. Nor do we suggest that judges act in
bad faith. What we do argue, however, is that, just as in administrative law,

215 Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial
Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 230, 234 (2009) (emphasis added); see also David S. Law, Strategic
Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 820
(2005) (explaining that judges may try to “steer the evolution of the law in a particular ideological direction by
publishing opinions they like” and offering some empirical data).
216 Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 51 FED. LAW.,
June 2004, at 36, 39.
217 See, e.g., Marla Brooke Tusk, Note, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1216 (2003) (“There is even some speculation that, because the Supreme Court is less
likely to grant certiorari to an appeal from an unpublished opinion, appellate judges may decide controversial
cases via unpublished opinions simply to insulate those decisions from Supreme Court review.”).
218 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 743 (2002) (not requiring “identical” facts).
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discretion in this context may have both intended and unintended consequences.
In evaluating whether discretion makes sense, it is necessary to weigh all the
costs and benefits and to consider whether safeguards are necessary.
IV. STRATEGIC IMMUNITY: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
For all the reasons explained in Part III, there is a danger that Pearson
discretion, especially when combined with discretion not to publish a decision,
may be put to strategic ends. The danger, however, might be more than just
theoretical. Using a data set of over 800 cases and nearly 1500 distinct
constitutional claims, this Part reviews how civil-rights claims for damages are
decided in the real world. Although we cannot say for certain that discretion is
used strategically, the data suggest that such use may be occurring.
A. Study Methodology
The purpose of this study is to assess how federal appellate courts are
deciding civil-rights cases in which qualified immunity is a defense. To do this,
we reviewed every federal appellate decision in Westlaw—including
unpublished decisions—issued from 2009 through the end of 2012 that cited
Pearson.219 We then excluded cases that did not involve qualified immunity but
that nonetheless mentioned Pearson. We also excluded en banc decisions. In
short, we only coded circuit court cases in which:
(1) a plaintiff brought at least one constitutional or federal statutory
claim seeking money damages against an individual governmentofficial defendant;
(2) the defendant raised a qualified immunity defense against that
claim; and

219 As detailed in The New Qualified Immunity, we focused on 2009 to 2012 because those cases created a
data set large enough for analysis; cases nearer in time to Pearson are more likely to cite Pearson instead of
circuit-specific precedent; and we wanted to avoid cases that may have come before the Supreme Court while
one of us, Nielson, was clerking there. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 30 n.185. For the purposes of
The New Qualified Immunity, the focus on cases citing Pearson made sense as we were trying to assess the effect
of Pearson in the lower courts. As discussed below, the exclusive focus on Pearson in this study imposes
methodological limitations to assess strategic judicial behavior. After all, an important strategic behavior not
captured by the cases reviewed is a court’s decision not to cite Pearson at all when deciding whether to reach
constitutional questions in the qualified immunity context. Moreover, we focused on circuit courts because—
outside of the Supreme Court—only those courts can clearly establish law. To be sure, there is some uncertainty
on this score. See, e.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (declining to decide whether circuit
precedent can clearly establish rights). Even so, it is conventionally understood that they can. See, e.g., Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011) (distinguishing district and circuit courts).
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(3) the court decided the merits of either the constitutional or statutory
claim, the qualified immunity claim, or both.220

This generated 844 cases. We then further broke down cases to reflect the
reality that often a single case presents more than one claim subject to a qualified
immunity defense: “Many cases, for instance, involve multiple defendants,
multiple claims (by which we mean an independent potential constitutional
violation considered by the appellate court, regardless of whether the potential
violation was labeled as a separate count in a party’s complaint), or both.”221 For
cases that “involved the same claim brought against multiple defendants,” we
listed the claims “separately only where the court reached different results for
different defendants.”222 The result was 1460 claims.223
B. The New Qualified Immunity Findings
In The New Qualified Immunity, we explored four findings from the cases
reviewed: (1) overall findings on the exercise of Pearson discretion and
constitutional stagnation; (2) circuit disparities in exercising Pearson discretion;
(3) preliminary findings on the potential political disparities in exercising
Pearson discretion; and (4) the rate of providing reasons for exercising, or not
exercising, Pearson discretion. Each will be briefly summarized in turn.
1. Pearson Discretion and Constitutional Stagnation. We looked at the
overall results to understand how circuit courts exercised their Pearson
discretion and whether constitutional stagnation concerns raised in the literature
are well-founded.224 Roughly half of the time (45.5%) circuit courts exercised
their Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions, whereas a quarter of
the time (26.7%) the courts opted just to declare that the right is not clearly
established.225 With respect to the remaining claims (27.7%), the court
determined it lacked any Pearson discretion because “the constitutional right
was clearly established at the time of the violation.”226 In other words, in those
220

Leong, supra note 74, at 685–86.
Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 31.
222 Leong, supra note 74, at 686.
223 The study methodology and its limitations are described in greater detail—and compared to prior
empirical studies of qualified immunity—in The New Qualified Immunity. See Nielson & Walker, supra note
33, at 27–33.
224 See id. at 33–38.
225 Id. at 33–34 & fig.1. As noted in The New Qualified Immunity, “[w]e label this option ‘not exercising
Pearson discretion’ for ease of reference, recognizing that the decision not to reach a constitutional question is
still, in a sense, an exercise of discretion provided by Pearson.” Id. at 34.
226 Id. at 34 & fig.1.
221
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cases, the court denied qualified immunity. When circuits exercised their
Pearson discretion to decide constitutional questions, in less than one in ten
instances (8.0%) did the court find a constitutional violation (that was not clearly
established)—what we call a “pure Saucier” exercise of discretion to recognize
new constitutional rights. The rest of the time (92.0%) the court found no
constitutional violation.227
In comparing these numbers to pre-Pearson empirical studies of qualified
immunity,228 we concluded “that courts decline to decide constitutional
questions at a rate similar to the pre-Saucier period—in around one in four cases,
as opposed to less than six percent during the Saucier regime.”229 The overall
rate of reaching constitutional questions accordingly has decreased after
Pearson. Moreover, as to constitutional stagnation in the pure Saucier sense, the
concern about post-Pearson stagnation appears well-founded. “[A]ll of the postPearson studies . . . found that circuit courts found constitutional violations of
rights that were not clearly established in 3.6%, 7.9%, and 2.5%, respectively,
of the total claims reviewed, whereas the three pre-Pearson studies found rates
ranging from 6.5% to 13.9% during the Saucier mandatory sequencing regime.
Our findings suggest something has changed.”230
2. Circuit Disparities. The cases reviewed also reveal great disparities among
circuits in how courts exercise Pearson discretion.231 We focused on the Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits—three of the circuits with the largest number of claims
in the cases reviewed. For instance, the rates of exercising Pearson discretion in
both the Fifth Circuit (57.6%) and the Ninth Circuit (36.0%) are statistically
significant (p < 0.05) in comparison with the national circuit average (46.4%)—
just in opposite directions.232 The same is true of the rates for not exercising
Pearson discretion and just finding that any right is not clearly established.
When zeroing in on how the circuits exercise Pearson discretion, there are no
statistically significant differences between these three circuits and the national
227

Id. at 35 & fig.2.
See Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation of
Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 418–19, 421, 423 tbl.1 (2009); Leong, supra note 74, at 684–
91; Colin Rolfs, Comment, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468, 490–97
(2011); Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 638–
39 (2011); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity
Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 525 (2010).
229 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 37.
230 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 37–38 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 37 tbl.1 (comparing all six
studies cited supra note 228).
231 See id. at 39–42.
232 Id. at 39–40 & fig.3. The rate in the Sixth Circuit is 47.7%. Id.
228
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average (90.5%) with respect to finding no constitutional violation. But with
respect to recognizing new constitutional rights (that are not clearly established),
the Fifth Circuit (1.3%), the Sixth Circuit (0.8%), and the Ninth Circuit (16.4%)
“all differ dramatically from the national average (9.5%), by a statistically
significant margin (p < 0.05).”233
Based on these findings, we concluded that “to the extent the numbers are
generalizable, these circuit-by-circuit disparities may reveal a geographic
distortion in the development of constitutional law,” suggesting that
“constitutional law may develop quite differently in the various circuits, such
that the Constitution means something different—and government actors are
constrained by different clearly established rights—among the fifty states.”234
Importantly, Pearson’s procedural grant of discretion could have systemic
effects in that “those [substantive] differences can be tied at least in part to
whether and how the circuits exercise their Pearson discretion differently to
decide constitutional questions.”235
3. Politics and Pearson. In The New Qualified Immunity, we also conducted
a preliminary inquiry into whether the political ideology of a judge affects how
the judge exercises Pearson discretion.236 To explore this issue, we used the
political party affiliation of the President who appointed the judge and focused
on the judge who authored the opinion. With respect to the rate of exercising
Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions, there are no statistically
significant differences (p < 0.05) based on party affiliation: “authors nominated
by a Democratic president (‘D judges’) and those nominated by a Republican
president (‘R judges’) both exercised Pearson discretion 43.3% and 45.0% of
the time, respectively.”237 Yet as to not exercising Pearson discretion (just
finding a right not clearly established) or finding no discretion to exercise (thus
denying qualified immunity), the differences are statistically significant: “R
judges were much more likely (27.4% to 18.0%) to decide not to exercise their
Pearson discretion,” whereas “D judges were more likely (38.8% to 27.1%) to
deny qualified immunity . . . .”238
233 Id. at 40–41 & fig.4. The national average here of 9.5% differs from the overall 8.0% figure provided
above because, for purposes of comparing circuits, “the national average is the average of the percentage for
each circuit, excluding the D.C. Circuit because it handled far fewer claims (only a dozen) in the sample and
seems to be an outlier.” Id. at 39 n.209.
234 Id. at 41–42.
235 Id. at 42.
236 See id. at 43–49.
237 Id. at 45–46 & fig.5.
238 Id.
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Moreover, when exercising Pearson discretion, there are no statistically
significant differences (p < 0.05) between D and R judges with respect to finding
no constitutional violation, but the same cannot be said of the rate of finding
constitutional violations that are not clearly established: “D judges found
constitutional violations nearly twice as often as R judges (13.1% and 6.7%,
respectively) . . . .”239 Based on these findings, we posited that after Pearson
“the development of constitutional law might be shifting away from those with
certain substantive constitutional views and toward those with others”—a shift
that may “not be due to a change in the substantive views of the federal judiciary
at large, but instead due to philosophical inclinations not to reach constitutional
questions unnecessarily.”240 Part IV.C.1 of this Article explores the potential
role of politics in the exercise of Pearson discretion in more nuanced ways—
looking at each panel member’s vote as well as at potential panel effects on the
exercise of discretion.
4. Rate of Reason-Giving. Finally, we documented the dearth of reasongiving by the circuit courts when exercising, or not exercising, their Pearson
discretion to reach constitutional questions.241 When courts determined they had
discretion to reach the constitutional question, “[i]n less than one in ten of those
instances (8.1% or 85 claims) did the court provide any reason for why it had
decided to exercise (or not) its Pearson discretion.”242 When giving a reason,
“courts more often than not (69.4% or 59 claims) included at least one reason
expressly provided in the Pearson opinion.”243 Among the reasons given that
were not explicitly mentioned in the Pearson opinion, “a recurring theme was
that the circuit court was just following the district court’s sequencing.”244
Moreover, courts were four times more likely to provide a reason when
deciding to avoid the constitutional question (15.4%) than when exercising their
discretion to decide the constitutional question (3.8%).245 Perhaps this difference
is not a coincidence, as it is consistent with the lopsided provision of reasons
against (eleven reasons) and for (four reasons) reaching a constitutional question
provided in the Pearson opinion itself.246 Based on these findings we
recommended that the Supreme Court “require lower courts—both trial and
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id. at 47–48 & fig.6.
Id. at 48.
See id. at 49–51.
Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
Id. at 49–51 & figs.8–9.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 49.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–42 (2009); see also supra notes 96–97.
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appellate courts—to give reasons for exercising (or not) their Pearson discretion
to reach constitutional questions.”247
C. Strategic Immunity Findings
The New Qualified Immunity examines some of the dangers of Pearson
discretion, including whether the lower courts are striking the right balance
between constitutional avoidance and stagnation. We concluded that because
there is a risk of stagnation and disuniform development of constitutional law,
the Court should revise Pearson to require judges to give reasons for the exercise
of their discretion.248 In this way, discretion can better accomplish its intended
purpose: preventing constitutional stagnation without imposing shackles that are
imprudent in particular cases.
This Article, by contrast, examines other dangers that the Justices did not
consider, much less intend: the opportunities for strategic judicial behavior that
may be caused—or at least exacerbated by—Pearson’s grant of maximalist
discretion. This theoretical risk is particularly troubling because it suggests, for
instance, that not only is constitutional stagnation real, but that sometimes it may
not be by accident. Instead, judges may be using their discretion in strategic
ways, including by deliberately avoiding the recognition of new constitutional
rights, even in situations where an application of the Pearson factors would
suggest that the constitutional merits should be reached. This is a novel fear that
has not been explored in the literature. As discussed in Part III.C, suboptimal
behavior in the qualified immunity context could include at least two strategies:
the improper exercise (or not) of Pearson discretion to reach constitutional
questions, perhaps due to panel compromises, collegiality concerns, or a desire
to avoid further judicial review (Part IV.C.1); and the improper publication (or
not) of the panel’s decision, perhaps for similar reasons noted above
(Part IV.C.2). This Part empirically assesses, at least as a preliminary matter,249
those theoretical risks in the qualified immunity context.

247 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 52; accord Beermann, supra note 34, at 175 (“At a minimum, in
light of the strong reasons for reaching the constitutional merits, courts should be required to give reasons for
not doing so.”).
248 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 65.
249 In this preliminary inquiry we rely solely on basic tests of statistical significance. As further research is
undertaken, however, one should incorporate regression analysis, and it may be useful to employ semiparametric
matching rather than standard regression analysis. Cf. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin,
Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 389 (2010). In other words, our study’s
tentative analysis should not be the final word on this issue.
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Before turning to the empirical findings with respect to these two types of
strategic behavior, however, it is important to underscore one important
methodological limitation: the study focuses exclusively on circuit decisions that
cite Pearson.250 As such, the data set does not include the entire universe of
qualified immunity decisions issued during the relevant time period, and it is
possible—though based on our experience not likely—that the sample of cases
citing Pearson is not representative of qualified immunity decisions more
generally. Likewise, this study does not capture a potentially important strategic
behavior: a court’s decision not to cite Pearson at all when deciding whether to
reach constitutional questions in the qualified immunity context.
1. Panel Effects and Strategic (Non)Use of Discretion
As discussed in Part IV.B, to assess the effect of the political ideology of a
judge on the exercise of Pearson discretion, we limited our preliminary inquiry
in The New Qualified Immunity to the political affiliation of the President who
appointed the judge who authored the opinion. Aside from the fact that the
political affiliation of the nominating President may be a poor proxy for the
political ideology of the authoring judge,251 an exclusive focus on the authoring
judge in appellate panels that typically consist of three judges does not fully
capture the effects that ideological preferences may play in the exercise of
Pearson discretion.

250 These are, of course, not the only methodological limitations. For instance, any attempt to draw
inferences about the legal system from a selection of trial or appellate opinions has problems. See, e.g., George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1984); Theodore
Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on
Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 100, 100 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 503–04 (1989). The purpose of this study,
however, is not to draw inferences about the larger legal system but to better understand the strategic
considerations that may affect how circuit courts exercise their discretion to develop constitutional law based on
the cases that reach their dockets—recognizing that there are selection effects embedded in the sample of legal
disputes that reach the appellate stage.
251 See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 521
n.181 (2011) (“[T]ests using the party of the nominating president as a proxy for a judge’s ideological attitudes
may underestimate the impact of those attitudes.” (citing Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial
Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 170–71 (2009))). But see Jeremy
D. Horowitz, Not Taking “No” for an Answer: An Empirical Assessment of Dissents from Denial of Rehearing
En Banc, 102 GEO. L.J. 59, 73 (2013) (noting that the party of a judge’s nominating President can shed some
insight “when looking at a large number of judges and decisions” (citing Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 303 (2004))); Daniel R.
Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243
(1999) (observing that party can be a useful indicator of ideology after conducting a meta-analysis of studies).

NIELSON_WALKER GALLEYSPROOFS3

102

9/26/2016 8:37 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:55

Here, accordingly, we offer a more nuanced evaluation of judicial behavior
by focusing on the conduct of all judges on the panel. In particular, Figure 1
depicts how circuit courts ruled on qualified immunity grounds, broken down
by the party affiliation of the President who appointed the opinion author as well
as by the party affiliation of the President who appointed all of the judges in each
case. In other words, the latter category includes as separate data points the vote
of each judge on the panel.252

FIGURE 1. Post-Pearson Qualified Immunity and Party Affiliation of Judges’
Nominating President
As Figure 1 details, the rate of exercising Pearson discretion is not different
based on the party affiliation of the President who nominated the authoring
judge: authors nominated by a Democratic President (D authoring judges) and
those nominated by a Republican President (R authoring judges) exercised
Pearson discretion 43.3% and 45.0% of the time, respectively. Nor is there a
difference between D authoring judges (43.3%) and all D judges (43.1%), or R
authoring judges (45.0%) and all R judges (43.1%).
As highlighted in The New Qualified Immunity, however, the differences in
the other two categories are statistically significant (p < 0.05) as to the authoring
judges.253 In contrast to D authoring judges, R authoring judges were more likely
252 The numbers of all judges reported in Figures 1 and 2 include all judges on unsigned or per curiam
opinions.
253 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 45–46. To assess statistical significance for political affiliation
(p < 0.05), we assume that if there is no bias in the distribution, the results would be 50/50. That is, if observing
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(27.4% to 18.0%) to decide not to exercise their Pearson discretion and just hold
that the right was not clearly established. Conversely, D authoring judges were
more likely (38.8% to 27.1%) than R authoring judges to deny qualified
immunity by finding a violation of a clearly established right.254
Yet when one examines the votes of all judges—and not just the authoring
judges—there is a surprising shift. To be sure, there is no noteworthy shift with
respect to R authoring judges compared to all R judges as to not exercising
Pearson discretion (27.4% to 27.2%) or to finding no discretion to exercise
(27.1% to 29.7%). With respect to D judges, however, there is a change. In
particular, when the universe of D judges is examined, it appears that D judges
as a whole are much more similar to R judges as a whole than they are to D
authoring judges as to (1) not exercising Pearson discretion (27.2% to 18.0%),
and as to (2) finding no discretion to exercise (29.7% to 38.8%). Put another
way, any significant difference between R and D judges disappears when one
examines all judges as opposed to limiting the analysis to the authoring judges.
What’s going on? It appears that when a D judge is assigned an opinion, she
behaves differently than when asked simply to join an opinion. It is unclear why
this is so, but one potential reason, at least in some cases, might be strategy. A
D judge may have certain preferences, all else being equal, and when that judge
can author the opinion, she may try to capture some of those preferences
(realizing that other judges will have to incur costs if they want to change the
opinion). But when another judge has authored the opinion, the costs of
disagreeing are too significant to rock the boat. Or, conversely, when a D judge
has indicated a willingness to dissent, the majority compromises in its opinion
to avoid a divided opinion. It also, of course, may suggest that panels are more
opinions through the lens of political affiliation and assuming no bias, a judge nominated by a Democratic
President would have the same odds of deciding a given question as a judge nominated by a Republican
President. The results will split down the middle. If, however, the political affiliation of the nominating President
affects the way judges decide opinions, the odds will be skewed according to that variable. For determining
statistical relevance, we compare the percentage of events occurring given a specific categorization to the
expected value of an unbiased—50/50—result. Some normalization was required (i.e., D to R), since there is a
disparity between the total number of claims decided by each party. Otherwise, a 50/50 split is already skewed.
This has some caveats, so normalization was always done in the most conservative manner possible. We used
Prism software to run parts-of-a-whole comparisons (actually a two-tailed binomial distribution given the input
value versus the expected output value, which is why we arrive at a P-value) on the positive values observed
from the dominant population in the data against the normalized values of the minority group in the data.
Moreover, chi-squared tests for independence were performed to assess whether there was statistical evidence
to suggest that nominating party mattered as to the three types of decisions depicted in Figure 1 as well as the
two types of decisions depicted in Figure 2. The results were consistent with those of the binomial test reported
herein.
254 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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willing to allow D nominated judges to author opinions that find liability,
perhaps because D nominated judges prefer such assignments.
By contrast, with respect to how D and R judges exercise Pearson
discretion—in particular, whether they recognize a new constitutional right in
the pure Saucier sense or find no constitutional violation—the political findings
stay roughly the same whether one looks at authoring judge or all judges.
Figure 2 breaks down the exercise of Pearson discretion, again based both on
the party affiliation of the President who appointed the opinion author and the
party affiliation of the President who appointed all of the judges in each case.

FIGURE 2. Exercise of Pearson Discretion and Party Affiliation of Judges’
Nominating President
As Figure 2 depicts, the differences between D and R authoring judges with
respect to finding no violation are not statistically significant. When exercising
Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions, R authoring judges found
no violation in 93.3% of the cases, as opposed to 86.0% for D authoring judges.
The same is not true, however, regarding the recognition of new constitutional
rights. When exercising Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions, D
authoring judges found constitutional violations nearly twice as often as R
authoring judges (14.1% and 6.7%, respectively)—a statistically significant
difference (p < 0.05). Moreover, comparing the authoring judge to all judges
does not make much of a difference. R authoring judges and all R judges found
no constitutional violation (93.3% to 93.2%) and recognized new constitutional
rights (6.7% to 6.8%) at roughly the same rates. And there is only a slight
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difference in D authoring judges and all D judges as to finding no constitutional
violation (86.0% to 89.9%) as well as to recognizing new constitutional rights
(14.1% to 10.1%). This may suggest that because it is especially significant to
recognize a new constitutional right, judges may have stronger preferences
regarding them.
In light of these differences in the data based on the authoring judge or all
judges, one may be tempted to conclude that an assessment of the votes of all
judges more accurately captures the effects of ideology on the exercise of
Pearson discretion. That too is overly simplistic. As scholars have documented
in empirical studies outside of the qualified immunity context, there may be
“panel effects” in federal circuit court decisionmaking.255 Matthew Stephenson
has explained that these panel effects come in two distinct flavors that “are
sometimes conflated even though they are quite different”: (1) “judges in the
ideological minority on a three-judge panel tend to vote with their colleagues
instead of dissenting”; and (2) “courts behave differently when there is at least
one judge on the panel who has political views that differ from the panel
majority,” such that “[m]ixed panels tend to be more moderate than homogenous
panels . . . .”256
For example, in a study of over 6000 published three-judge panel decisions
(with nearly 20,000 total votes of individual judges), Cass Sunstein, David
Schkade, Lisa Ellman, and Andrew Sawicki uncovered the following main
findings as to their entire sample:
[F]or purposes of analysis, we are taking, as the baseline, cases in
which a judge is sitting with one Democrat and one Republican, and
we are examining how voting patterns shift when a judge is sitting
instead with two Democratic appointees or two Republican appointees.
We can readily see that a Democrat, in the baseline condition, casts a
liberal vote 52 percent of the time, whereas a Republican does so 37
255 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY vii (2006); Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 249; David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking:
Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 819 (2005); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823, 851 (2006); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1762 (2005); Richard L. Revesz,
Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on
Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 685 (2000); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew
P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom
Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 491 (2004).
256 Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285, 307 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
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percent of the time. Sitting with two Democratic appointees,
Democratic appointees cast liberal votes 64 percent of the time (an
increase of 12 percent over baseline), whereas Republican appointees
do so 46 percent of the time (an increase of 9 percent over baseline).
Sitting with two Republican appointees, Democratic appointees cast
liberal votes 44 percent of the time (a decrease of 8 percent), whereas
Republican appointees do so only 31 percent of the time (a decrease of
6 percent). Thus, Republican appointees sitting with two Democratic
appointees show the same basic pattern of votes (46 percent liberal
votes) as do Democratic appointees sitting with two Republican
appointees (44 percent liberal votes).257

As Professor Stephenson has explained, “judges on court of appeals panels
sometimes make concessions to their colleagues,” including that “minority
judges will sometimes go along with the majority” (majority effect) and that
“majority judges will sometimes make concessions to the minority judge on the
panel” perhaps to avoid a separate dissent (diversity effect).258
In the post-Pearson qualified immunity context, these panel effects may be
even more pronounced in circumstances where the court does not conclude that
any constitutional right is clearly established. As discussed in Part III.C.1,
because such constitutional ruling has no effect on the parties before the court,
a judge in those circumstances may be more willing to compromise as to whether
to exercise Pearson discretion to decide the constitutional question. To explore
this idea, Figure 3 depicts how the three-judge panels ruled on qualified
immunity grounds, broken down by the four possible political configurations of
the panel.259

257

SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 255, at 23–24.
Stephenson, supra note 256, at 308.
259 A number of cases in the sample were decided by two-judge panels and thus are not included in this
analysis. As noted in Part IV.A, en banc decisions have also been excluded.
258
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FIGURE 3. Post-Pearson Qualified Immunity with Panel Effects
If we analyze these panel effects on the gross assumption that each group of
judges has an equal number of D or R judges—basically the court is like a bag
of judges and there is an equal probability (1:2) of pulling a D or R judge from
the bag—there is statistically significant evidence (p < 0.0001) to suggest that
each type of decision is not independent of the panel composition.260 Similarly,
when one panel composition is compared to the rest of the panel compositions,
there are statistically significant differences (p < 0.0001) as to all three
categories for the panels of all D judges (3D) and of all R judges (3R). As for
mixed panels, both the 2D-1R and 2R-1D panels have statistically significant
differences (p < 0.05) as to not exercising Pearson discretion. With 2D-1R, there
was also a statistically significant difference (p < 0.0001) as to exercising
Pearson discretion to decide a constitutional question.
If ideological composition did not matter at all, one would expect no
differences in these decisions based on the composition of the panel. As the prior
studies on panel effects demonstrate, however, we live in a world where
ideology matters. When the composition of the panel changes, the data suggest
that the behavior of the panel changes.
Moreover, this 50/50 approach is overly simplistic for the additional reason
that it is not representative of the real-world divide between the number of D
and R circuit judges (at least as observed in the cases reviewed). In particular, in
our data set there are votes from a total of 4299 judges—of which 1696 (39.5%)
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are D judges and 2603 (60.5%) are R judges. Accordingly, by normalizing the
expected panel compositions based on the 40/60 occurrence of D and R judges
in the sample, we get a more accurate picture of the panel effects in the cases
reviewed. Under this normalized approach, there remains statistically significant
evidence (p < 0.01) to suggest that a panel’s decision to exercise its Pearson
discretion to reach a constitutional decision as well as a panel’s finding of no
discretion to exercise (a denial of qualified immunity) are not independent of the
panel composition. But the same is no longer true as to a panel’s decision not to
exercise Pearson discretion and instead hold that a right is not clearly
established. This suggests that judges, when joined by ideologically similar
colleagues, may place special value on cases involving constitutional violations.
Similarly, when one panel composition is compared to the rest of the panel
compositions under this normalized model, other statistically significant results
emerge. As for unanimous 3D or 3R panels, the only statistically significant
difference (p < 0.001) is that 3R panels are more likely to exercise their Pearson
discretion to reach a constitutional question. As for mixed panels, the only
statistically significant results concern finding no discretion to exercise and thus
denying immunity. These results are significant, however, in opposite
directions: 2D-1R panels (p < 0.001) are statistically more likely to deny
qualified immunity as compared to the rest of the panel compositions, whereas
2R-1D panels (p < 0.05) panels are less likely to deny immunity.
These latter findings are interesting, though they may not tell us too much
about strategic approaches to exercising Pearson discretion. After all, a finding
of no qualified immunity, by definition, means the panel determined there was
no discretion to exercise. But it is interesting that 3R panels are more likely to
exercise Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions and thus develop
constitutional law. As we posited in The New Qualified Immunity, this finding
is in tension with the notion of “R judges’ minimalist inclination to avoid
constitutional rulings by just holding the right is not clearly established.”261 On
the other hand, perhaps it is not surprising that unanimous 3R panels would be
more aggressive in exercising their Pearson discretion if they did so to find no
constitutional violation. In other words, “[i]n grossly oversimplified terms, some
260

This is based on a chi-squared test to compare all four potential panel compositions with respect to the
probabilities that they exercised each of the three types of decisions depicted in Figure 3 as well as the two types
of decisions depicted in Figure 4. The chi-squared tests do not allow for examination of each type of panel
composition individually.
261 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 46. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3–4 (1999) (describing judicial minimalism).
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‘conservative’ judges may want to rule that the Constitution does not prohibit
the government action at issue to allow such action to continue . . . .”262
For these reasons, perhaps the more important inquiry is how D and R judges
rule when they decide to exercise their Pearson discretion. Figure 4 breaks down
the exercise of Pearson discretion by the four possible political configurations
of the panel.

FIGURE 4. Exercise of Pearson Discretion with Panel Effects
After normalizing these results based on the 40/60 D-R composition of the
sample, a number of interesting panel effects emerge.263 First, there is
statistically significant evidence (p < 0.0001) to suggest that a panel’s decision
to find no constitutional violation is not independent of the panel composition,
whereas the differences are not statistically significant (p < 0.05) as to a panel’s
decision to recognize a new constitutional right. Comparing each panel
composition to the rest of the panel compositions yields a number of statistically
significant results that are consistent with prior empirical studies on panel
effects. As for unanimous panels, 3D panels are more likely (p < 0.01) to
262

Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 47.
Under the overly simplistic 50/50 model, there is statistically significant evidence (p < 0.0001) to
suggest that a panel’s decision to find no constitutional violation is not independent of the panel composition,
whereas the differences are not statistically significant (p < 0.05) as to a panel’s decision to recognize a new
constitutional right. Moreover, when one panel composition is compared to the rest of the panel compositions,
there are statistically significant differences (p < 0.0001) as to 3D, 3R, and 2D-1R panels in finding no
constitutional violations (but not as to 2R-1D panels), and there are no statistically significant differences
(p < 0.05) as to any panel composition’s decision to recognize a new constitutional right.
263
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exercise their Pearson discretion to recognize new constitutional rights than the
other three panel compositions. Conversely, 3R panels are more likely
(p < 0.001) to exercise their Pearson discretion to find no constitutional
violation. In other words, “on unified panels, ideological tendencies are
amplified,” with “panels consisting of three Republican appointees show[ing]
systemically different outcomes than panels consisting of three Democratic
appointees.”264
Moreover, perhaps consistent with the “diversity effect” discussed above, on
mixed panels—either 2D-1R or 2R-1D—there are no statistically significant
differences as to either creating new constitutional rights or finding no
constitutional violation. In other words, it is quite possible that the panel effects
of a mixed panel in this context results in “the majority judges generally moving
toward the center just enough that the minority judge is willing to go along
without dissent.”265 Or, perhaps similar to what Tom Miles and Cass Sunstein
found in the administrative-law context, “[t]he most important lesson is that both
Democratic and Republican appointees show far more political voting patterns
when they are sitting on unified panels. When the panels are divided, the role of
politics is greatly dampened.”266
In sum, although this is just a preliminary inquiry into the strategic judicial
behavior that may be at play, the panel effects suggest that suboptimal exercise
of Pearson discretion may occur based on the composition of the panel. In
particular, D judges behave differently when they are the author of an opinion
rather than a judge joining an opinion. Panels composed of all D or all R judges
behave differently from mixed panels. Unanimous R-judge panels are more
likely to decide constitutional questions than unanimous D-judge panels (though
3R panels are also more likely to exercise such discretion to find no
constitutional violation). And all D-judge panels are most likely to recognize
new constitutional rights. None of this proves strategic behavior on the part of
judges, but the behavior is consistent with it.
2. Strategic (Non)Publication of Immunity Decisions
There is another potential avenue for strategic behavior: the ability not to
publish an immunity decision. As discussed in Part III.C.2, the ability not to
publish a decision allows for further compromise on a three-judge panel. In other
264
265
266

SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 255, at 129.
Stephenson, supra note 256, at 308.
Miles & Sunstein, supra note 255, at 852.
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words, a judge can compromise by joining a panel decision that is not optimal
or by compromising on a narrower unanimous panel decision, but part of the
compromise could also be that the panel agrees to issue an unpublished,
nonprecedential decision. Likewise, a panel that fears further review (from the
circuit en banc or the Supreme Court) may elect not to publish its decision, thus
making the decision less important going forward. As discussed in Part I.C,
unpublished decisions are particularly important in the qualified immunity
context because of their uneasy relationship to the creation of clearly established
law. In other words, strategic immunity does not just concern how panels
exercise their Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions, but also
whether they do so in published, precedential opinions. Figure 5 depicts how
circuit courts ruled on qualified immunity grounds, broken down by published
and unpublished decisions.

FIGURE 5. Post-Pearson Qualified Immunity and Publication Decisions
As Figure 5 details, there is nearly a 50/50 split between published decisions
(773 claims or 52.9%) and unpublished decisions (689 claims or 47.1%).267
Although there is no real difference (p < 0.05) in the rate of deciding not to
exercise Pearson discretion (just holding any right is not clearly established) in
published decisions (25.1%) versus unpublished decisions (28.6%), there are
statistically significant differences as to the other two categories. Courts were
267 For determining statistical relevance, we utilized the same method as for political affiliation, and
compared the percentage of events occurring given a specific categorization to the expected value of 50/50.
Some normalization was required, since there is a disparity between the total number of claims decided in
published and unpublished decisions. Otherwise, a 50/50 split is already skewed.
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more likely (p < 0.0001) to find no discretion to exercise, and thus deny
immunity, in published decisions (33.4% to 21.3%) (i.e., findings against
immunity for government actors are often published), whereas they were more
likely (p < 0.05) to exercise Pearson discretion to reach constitutional questions
in unpublished decisions (50.1% to 41.5%) (i.e., constitutional decisions are less
likely to be published).
At first blush, both of these findings may seem surprising. After all, to deny
qualified immunity, the court must find that the government actor violated
clearly established constitutional law, and that law must be established by prior
precedent. In other words, by definition, all the court is doing is applying
established precedent without creating new law—something that should be quite
suitable for an unpublished decision. Yet nearly two-thirds (63.7%) of all
decisions denying qualified immunity are published. On the other hand,
stripping a government actor of immunity for violating clearly established law
is a significant judicial action. The court may well want to send a strong and
clear measure to other government actors via a published decision.
These results are somewhat surprising when broken down by R and D
authoring judges. When utilizing unpublished decisions, R authoring judges
seemed more likely than D authoring judges to deny qualified immunity.268 Put
differently, it appears that R authoring judges were more likely to rule against
the government official in a nonprecedential opinion. Indeed, the cases reviewed
reveal a striking number of 3R unpublished decisions—oftentimes quite
lengthy—where the panel denied qualified immunity.269 These cases suggest
some strategic use of unpublished decisions. For instance, these judges may fear
the penumbral effect of a published opinion—i.e., the fact that a finding of no
immunity in one case can be used in subsequent cases to say the law was clearly
established, even if those subsequent cases have slightly different facts.

268 This finding is statistically significant only at a lower level (p < 0.1) than we set as the baseline for the
rest of the findings (p < 0.05).
269 See, e.g., Anderson v. McCaleb, 480 F. App’x 768, 773 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (reversing the
district court’s grant of qualified immunity in the excessive force context by 3R panel in a somewhat lengthy,
unpublished, unsigned decision); Quint v. Vill. of Deerfield, 365 F. App’x 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing
the grant of qualified immunity by 3R panel in the unlawful search and seizure context); Evans v. City of Etowah,
312 F. App’x 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the denial of qualified immunity in the unlawful arrest context
by 3R panel); Haley v. Elsmere Police Dep’t, 452 F. App’x 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming the denial of
qualified immunity in the unlawful arrest context by 3R panel though over a dissent); see also Comeaux v.
Sutton, 496 F. App’x 368, 375 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (reversing the district court’s grant of immunity in
the excessive force context by 2D-1R in a somewhat lengthy, unpublished, unsigned opinion).
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Similarly, it may seem odd that courts more often exercise Pearson
discretion to answer constitutional questions in unpublished decisions. But that
finding is only noteworthy when placed in the context of how the court exercised
Pearson discretion. It would not be unusual for a court to hold in an unpublished
opinion that there is no constitutional violation because, for instance, existing
precedent has already established that the government action is constitutional.
Conversely, it would seem quite odd for a court to recognize a new constitutional
right in an unpublished decision, as such rights recognition arguably would not
create clearly established law. Figure 6 depicts how courts exercise Pearson
discretion in published and unpublished opinions.

FIGURE 6. Exercise of Pearson Discretion and Publication Decisions
As Figure 6 details, whereas there is no statistically significant difference
(p < 0.05) as to courts finding no constitutional violation in published (86.9%)
or unpublished (96.8%) decisions, the results show statistically significant
differences as to pure Saucier decisions: courts were more likely to exercise their
Pearson discretion to recognize new constitutional rights in published opinions
(13.1%) as opposed to unpublished opinions (3.2%). Put differently, four in five
pure Saucier decisions (42 claims or 79.3%) were published.
What do these publication rates tell us about strategic immunity? Panel
decisions not to exercise Pearson discretion, and instead just to hold that a right
is not clearly established, are pretty evenly distributed between published
(49.6%) and unpublished (50.4%) decisions. The act of not publishing one of
these decisions could implicate strategic immunity as it would allow another
panel—in a case with perhaps better facts or better lawyering—to declare that
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the right is indeed clearly established. From these data, it is difficult to tell
whether opinions are being unpublished for strategic reasons.
Similarly, panel decisions to exercise discretion to answer the constitutional
questions are also pretty evenly distributed between published (48.2%) and
unpublished (51.8%) decisions. And, moreover, when panels exercise Pearson
discretion to find no constitutional violation, there is no statistically significant
difference (p < 0.05) between their use of published (45.5%) or unpublished
(55.5%) decisions. Again, the act of not publishing a decision finding no
constitutional violation could involve strategic compromise, as a subsequent
panel would not be bound by the panel’s nonprecedential constitutional ruling.
Once more, however, it is difficult to tell from the data whether that is occurring,
but there certainly is some evidence for it.
A closer look at the unpublished decisions, moreover, provides strong
anecdotal support for strategic use of unpublished decisions. For instance, there
are a surprising number of divided opinions—i.e., opinions with a dissent—that
are not published. Many judges would have denied qualified immunity entirely
because there was a violation of a clearly established constitutional right—at
least at the pleading or summary judgment stage.270 Moreover, some agreed to
270 See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bainbridge Island, 472 F. App’x 538, 541 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (Gould,
J., dissenting) (dissenting in excessive force context as to the majority’s finding of no constitutional violation);
Jordan v. Brown, 489 F. App’x 190, 191 (9th Cir. 2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I would affirm the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.”); Smith v. Cty. of Lenawee, 505 F. App’x
526, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kethledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I would affirm the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity to Westgate. Unlike Dye—who I think presents a close case, but who at
least showed concern by putting Smith in a padded cell and calling Dr. Stickney—Westgate basically took no
action at all during his four-hour shift on the night before Smith died.”); Williams v. Port Huron Sch. Dist., 455
F. App’x 612, 622 (6th Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the district court that, given the facts as
pleaded by the Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude that Dalke and Jones were deliberately indifferent to
the harassment at Port Huron Northern.”); Estate of Henson v. Callahan, 440 F. App’x 352, 359 (5th Cir. 2011)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (“I respectfully dissent. In my view, there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that each of the three elements of supervisory liability is satisfied, and thus that the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity to Sheriff Callahan should be affirmed.”); Neal v. Melton, 453 F. App’x 572, 581
(6th Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Taking the facts in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiffs, I believe that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the Plaintiffs after completion
of the vehicle-registration check in order to conduct a canine sweep.”); Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, 439 F.
App’x 433, 459 (6th Cir. 2011) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I respectfully dissent from
the majority’s determination that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Rodriguez’s
claims of retaliation and harassment under the First Amendment.”); Poulakis v. Rogers, 341 F. App’x 523, 540
(11th Cir. 2009) (Quist, J., dissenting) (“My larger concern is that this Court’s decision sends a signal to police
officers that they are free to ignore the law of the intermediate state appellate courts by which they are otherwise
bound, and an unambiguous statute, without concern for violating an individual’s federal constitutional rights.
Therefore, I would reverse on qualified immunity and remand for consideration of the other defenses Defendants
raised in their summary judgment motion.”).
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the grant of qualified immunity but disagreed with the majority that there was
an underlying constitutional violation.271 Finally, other dissenters would have
held that there was no constitutional violation at all.272
Any dissent from an unpublished decision should raise some concerns that
perhaps the opinion should have been published, and thus a compromise not to
publish had been reached.273 After all, unpublished opinions are generally
understood to apply settled law,274 and a dissent suggests that may not be the
case—though, to be sure, some dissents may agree as to the applicable law but
disagree as to its application with regard to particular facts. In the qualified
immunity context, such divided, unpublished decisions may well be even
stronger evidence of strategic judicial behavior where, for instance, the majority
has conceded that its denial of qualified immunity—and thus holding that a
clearly established constitutional right had been violated—would not be issued
in a published decision. The fight still takes place, but it takes place in the
nonprecedential shadows.
What is perhaps most interesting, and which may provide compelling
evidence of strategic behavior, are the eleven unpublished pure Saucier
decisions.275 In the cases reviewed, nearly one in five pure Saucier decisions is
271 See, e.g., Koch v. Lockyer, 340 F. App’x 372, 375 (9th Cir. 2009) (Clifton, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I agree with my colleagues that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity . . . , but I strongly disagree with the conclusions that the collection of Koch’s DNA violated the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
272 See, e.g., Estate of Henson v. Callahan, 440 F. App’x 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2011) (Owen, J., concurring)
(“I join Judge Southwick’s holding that Sheriff Thomas Callahan is entitled to qualified immunity. With respect,
however, I do not join his opinion.”); Haley v. Elsmere Police Dep’t, 452 F. App’x 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2011)
(Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Because Markesbery had probable cause to arrest Haley, I would reverse the district
court’s denial of summary judgment on the unlawful arrest claim.”).
273 See, e.g., Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (focusing on the presence of a dissent from a lengthy majority opinion as evidence that the decision
should have been published).
274 See supra Part I.C.
275 Akrawi v. Remillet, 504 F. App’x 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting defendants’ challenge to the award
of attorney’s fees where the grant of qualified immunity was affirmed because plaintiff “prevailed on his central
claim—that the defendants violated his right to due process”); Escobar v. Mora, 496 F. App’x 806, 813 (10th
Cir. 2012) (“[W]hile we have extrapolated from general principles here to hold that Mr. Escobar stated an Eighth
Amendment claim, we cannot say that the analytical bridge from the former principles to the latter holding
impressed itself upon us with the clarity necessary to conclude that defendants were on fair notice that their
conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation.”); Saavedra v. Scribner, 482 F. App’x 268 (9th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (finding two separate due process violations in the administrative-segregation context but granting
qualified immunity); Kozel v. Duncan, 421 F. App’x 843, 850 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Although we have determined
that there was a constitutional violation in the prolonged sobriety detention, we must still consider whether a
reasonable officer in Sheriff Duncan’s position would have been on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Mr.
Kozel has not met his burden in this regard.”); Rivers v. Fischer, 390 F. App’x 22, 24 (2nd Cir. 2010) (per
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not published. The fact that there are any such unpublished decisions should be
surprising.276 After all, pure Saucier decisions are intended to recognize a new
constitutional right and thus develop constitutional law, yet announcing such
new law in an unpublished opinion generally does not create clearly established
constitutional law for future litigants, or at least, at a minimum, does not do so
as emphatically. Why would a panel not publish a pure Saucier opinion since
their whole point is to clearly establish law?
A closer look at the panel composition with respect to these eleven claims
provides further support for strategic immunity. Four of the eleven claims are
included in unpublished opinions authored by R judges, whereas the remaining
seven claims are included in unsigned opinions (also known as per curiam
opinions). In other words, no D judge authored any of these opinions. Yet, of
the thirty-three judges ruling on these claims, fourteen were D judges. It should
be noted that one of those D judges actually dissented in part from the
unpublished opinion because he would “conclude[] that a First Amendment
violation has not been shown” (interestingly, with regards to a “conservative”
speech issue, namely, anti-abortion speech).277 It may also be worth noting that
curiam) (concluding that “there is no doubt that Rivers’s constitutional rights were violated when the Department
of Corrections administratively imposed a 5-year term of supervised release that was not orally pronounced by
the sentencing judge” but concluding that right was not clearly established at time of the incident); Rock for
Life–UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 F. App’x 541, 555 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Although the district court erred by holding
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact whether the defendants regulated their speech based
on its content, the defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
brought against them in their individual capacities.”); id. at 558 (King, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment) (“I agree with the majority that we should award qualified immunity to the
defendants on the as-applied First Amendment challenge to UMBC’s policy on facilities use, but I would get
there by a different route—namely, by concluding that a First Amendment violation has not been shown.”);
Schwenk v. Cty. of Alameda, 364 F. App’x 336, 337 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“We affirm the dismissal as
to Lacativo on the basis of qualified immunity. At the time of the alleged conduct, we had not yet decided Burke,
which expressly held that ‘parents with legal custody, regardless of whether they also possess physical custody
of their children’ have a liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.” (citing Burke
v. Cty. of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 731, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2009))); Solis v. Oules, 378 F. App’x 642, 644 (9th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (granting immunity yet finding that the officer “violated Solis’s Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when he stopped her vehicle and apparently removed her
from it under a law that did not criminalize her behavior”); Koch, 340 F. App’x at 374 (per curiam) (“While the
compulsory DNA collection violated Koch’s Fourth Amendment rights, Appellees are entitled to qualified
immunity against damages.”); Thompson v. Williams, 320 F. App’x 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(granting qualified immunity but affirming “that Thompson’s religious beliefs are sincerely held and that there
are triable issues as to whether the prison’s policy violates the First Amendment or RLUIPA”).
276 To be sure, two of these decisions noted that the right had already been recognized in a prior published
decision but that the incident at issue took place prior to that decision’s publication and thus was not clearly
established at the time of the incident. Rivers, 390 F. App’x at 24; Schwenk, 364 F. App’x at 337.
277 Rock for Life–UMBC, 411 F. App’x at 558 (King, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
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six of these eleven claims were decided in unpublished decisions issued by the
Ninth Circuit.278
In sum, to fully appreciate the suboptimal judicial behavior for which the
post-Pearson new qualified immunity standard provides, it is important to look
not only at the panel effects involved in exercising (or not exercising) Pearson
discretion, but also the panel’s strategic decision to publish (or not to publish)
its immunity decision. As discussed in Part IV.C.1, the panel effects are
pronounced and statistically significant—suggesting that the unified panels are
more aggressive in finding no constitutional violations (for 3R panels) and in
recognizing new constitutional rights (for 3D panels), and that mixed panels lead
to more normal patterns in the use of Pearson discretion. It is more difficult to
ascertain from this data set the effect of unpublished decisions. That said, R
authoring judges seem more likely to put immunity denials in unpublished
decisions, and the set of unpublished decisions reveal a number of divided
opinions where strategic compromise may have taken place. And, of course,
there is the surprising finding that one in five pure Saucier decisions is not
published.
V. COUNTERACTING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
For the foregoing reasons, there are both theoretical and empirical grounds
to fear that courts may use their Pearson discretion in qualified immunity cases
in suboptimal ways. This Article’s basic point is that in crafting the procedures
for qualified immunity, the Supreme Court did not pay enough attention to an
important insight from administrative law: When it comes to discretion,
unintended consequences can be just as important as intended consequences, and
one should never lose sight of incentives.
The question becomes: What, if anything, should be done to combat such
strategic behavior? On one hand, sometimes the best response to the risk of
discretion’s abuse is to eliminate discretion altogether. Just as agencies—as a
rule—lack discretion to promulgate regulations with retroactive effect,279
perhaps judges should never clarify law in cases where the right was not clearly

278
279

See supra note 275.
See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
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established.280 Or, in the same spirit, perhaps the Court should return to Saucier,
which would also deprive judges of discretion, albeit in the other direction.281
On the other hand, sometimes the danger of discretion does outweigh its
utility and no safeguard is cost justified. Just as agencies generally have total
discretion when it comes to whether to bring enforcement actions,282 perhaps the
Supreme Court should conclude that notwithstanding the risk of strategic
behavior, there is no need for safeguards in the qualified immunity context.
We recommend a middle position. In administrative law, the optimal
solution is often to mitigate the danger of discretion through safeguards.
Safeguards are not perfect; some misuses of discretion slip through the cracks,
and sometimes agency action is wrongly condemned. But in terms of a meta
cost-benefit analysis, this middle-ground approach is often a better solution than
the alternatives: unchecked discretion or no discretion at all. In our view, the
same sort of middle-ground approach makes sense in the qualified immunity
context. In Pearson, the Justices’ unanimous opinion stated that “constitutional
stagnation” is a legitimate concern.283 The opinion also recognized, however,
that Saucier was too costly.284 Hence the Court seized on discretion as the best
tool available to sort out cases in which it makes sense to decide constitutional
questions from those in which it does not.285 The Court’s instinct was wise;
discretion can be useful. The Court erred, however, by not considering how this
new discretion might be abused and by not thinking about ways to minimize that
risk.
We recommend at least three devices to safeguard against these abuses: a
reason-giving requirement, revised certiorari criteria, and greater informal
vigilance. While these safeguards will not prevent all risks of strategic behavior,
they should reduce it in a way that, on the whole, is cost justified.

280 See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 714 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring); Nielson & Walker, supra note
33, at 52 (citing Camreta, 563 U.S. at 727 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
281 See Reinhardt, supra note 17, at 1250.
282 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
283 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
284 Id. at 236–37.
285 See id. at 236.
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A. Courts Should Be Required to Give Reasons
In The New Qualified Immunity, we explained why requiring reason-giving
frequently makes sense, including in the qualified immunity context.286 Reasongiving is often a sensible, low-cost way to mitigate concerns that discretion will
be abused. Reason-giving may be more useful when the concern is that certain
important values may be overlooked (which we discussed in The New Qualified
Immunity) rather than when the concern is that the delegate has incentives to act
strategically (the focus here). But giving reasons has value in both contexts.
Again, consider administrative law. Agencies also sometimes have selfinterested incentives. Nonetheless, reason-giving is still a useful curative. Some
explanations, for instance, do not have the ring of truth to them.287
In light of the findings in this Article, moreover, the Supreme Court should
also require lower courts to give reasons for not publishing opinions, at least for
opinions in which the court exercises its Pearson discretion to decide a
constitutional question. Unpublished decisions, de facto and often de jure, do
not carry the same weight in creating clearly established law as published
opinions. Accordingly, before a court issues an unpublished qualified immunity
opinion, it should explain itself. Again, this Article does not claim that this
requirement will be a silver bullet. But it may help mitigate this discretionary
danger.
B. For Certiorari Review, Panel Composition Should Matter More,
Publication Status Less
To reform qualified immunity, moreover, we also urge the Court to be
mindful of this Article’s findings when it considers whether to grant certiorari.
In particular, the Justices should pay more attention to panel composition than
they do today and less attention to whether an opinion is published—at least in
the qualified immunity context.
For reasons explained above, homogeneous panels pose risks, at least in
some respects; they are more likely to decide a constitutional question—3R
panels in finding no constitutional violation, and 3D panels in recognizing new
constitutional rights—including perhaps in situations where, applying the

286 Nielson & Walker, supra note 33, at 52–65. Because this recommendation was explored at length in The
New Qualified Immunity, we will not repeat that discussion here.
287 See, e.g., EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting agency
excuses for failure to consult per the statute’s requirement).
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Pearson factors, a constitutional decision should not be made. At the same time,
heterogeneous panels may also be dangerous in some respects, in that the panel
majority may have compromised its position to avoid a dissent. Or, perhaps, the
minority judge may have joined the majority as a collegial concurrence.
Homogenous panels may be more or less likely than a heterogeneous panel to
publish a decision finding a constitutional violation; this matters because some
types of decisions should be published but are not potentially because of
strategic compromise.
Similarly, the fact that a decision is unpublished should carry little weight in
certiorari review. To be sure, as a formal matter, the Supreme Court can review
unpublished decisions and, indeed, has already stated that “the fact that the Court
of Appeals’ order under challenge here is unpublished carries no weight in our
decision to review the case.”288 Yet in practice, whether a decision is published
surely does play a role in whether the Court decides to review a decision. For
instance, the Office of the U.S. Solicitor General—the preeminent expert on this
subject—urges the fact that a decision is unpublished as a reason to reject
certiorari.289 And, indeed, the Court seldom grants certiorari for unpublished
opinions.290
Unpublished opinions, however, may be where strategic decisionmaking
often occurs, at least in the qualified immunity context. Even if judges are not
hiding opinions that flout Supreme Court precedent, they may use the
nonpublishing power to make them less attractive for Supreme Court review.
For instance, the data show that one in five pure Saucier decisions is
unpublished. This means panels are deciding novel constitutional questions,
finding violations, but yet not going all the way and publishing the opinion.
Likewise, certain panels with R authoring judges appear less likely to publish
decisions stripping government actors of qualified immunity than other panels.
To be clear, this Article is not proposing radical change. Even in the context
of qualified immunity, most lower-court decisions are sound. But at the margins,

288

Comm’r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987).
See, e.g., Brief for the United States in Opposition at 12, Johnson v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 318 (2015)
(No. 15-16) (“The unpublished decision below . . . sets no precedent.”); Brief for the Respondent in Opposition
at 14, Rangolan v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 903 (2008) (No. 07-1169) (“[T]he court of appeals’ brief, unpublished
decision would not be an appropriate vehicle for resolving the question presented, because the court did not
provide an explanation for why it dismissed the petition for review.”).
290 See Gerken, supra note 114, at 486 (“[A] review of the cases considered by the Court in any recent term
demonstrates that virtually all of those cases involve a review of published courts of appeals decisions.”).
289
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a shift in certiorari focus may reduce the incentives that judges have to use their
discretion in suboptimal ways.
C. The Supreme Court Should Police Discretion Informally
Finally, there is much to be said for informal sanctions. If the Supreme Court
is aware of the risk that discretion presents, it will pay more attention to it
generally. If the Justices were to speak critically of using discretion in strategic
ways, that itself may change practices. Judges value their reputations.
Again, administrative law provides a good comparison. For agencies,
judicial review reduces “the likelihood that the agency will exercise its
discretion in a way that . . . reflect[s] the agency’s self-interest.”291 Indeed, “[i]t
is a great tonic to a program to discover that even if a regulation can be slipped
or wrestled through various layers of internal or external review without
significant change, the final and most prestigious reviewing forum of all” will
cast a skeptical eye on the agency’s action.292 Review therefore “give[s] those
who care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever
with which to move those who do not.”293
Even though the Supreme Court should not reverse a judgment because of
strategic use of discretion in the qualified immunity context (after all, the same
party presumably should win regardless of whether the circuit court reached the
constitutional merits or whether the decision was published), it can increase the
costs of strategic behavior by imposing a stigma on it. The Court, for instance,
sometimes calls out a specific court by name.294 In this context too, such public
shaming strikes us as a useful weapon in the Court’s arsenal.

291 Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271,
289 (1986).
292 William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 60 (1975)
(discussing circuit courts).
293 Id.
294 See, e.g., White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 462 (2015) (per curiam) (“As a final matter, this Court again
advises the Court of Appeals [for the Sixth Circuit] that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force even
when reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the death penalty.”); Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014)
(“We have before cautioned the lower courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—against ‘framing our
precedents at such a high level of generality.’” (citation omitted)); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)
(“We have repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular . . .—not to define clearly established law
at a high level of generality.” (citation omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
If we were all angels, there would be no need for judicial review. When it
comes to discretion, however, the experience of the modern administrative state
confirms that skepticism is sometimes warranted. This is why the Supreme Court
is often distrustful of discretion. That distrust does not mean that discretion is
not valuable or that its benefits never outweigh its costs. To the contrary,
discretion is very valuable and regularly exceeds its costs. It does mean,
however, that no one should blink away the reality that even dutiful agents trying
to do their best may end up using discretion in suboptimal ways, even sometimes
to benefit themselves.
Why are judges different? Judges deciding qualified immunity cases have
been entrusted with a great deal of discretion, and they too face complex
incentives. Nonetheless, when it comes to clarifying constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court’s current procedural doctrine trusts judges to make decisions
based solely on what is good for the law. Judges, no doubt, also generally use
their discretion to serve the public interest, but there is a danger that they may
not always do so. Because judges, like agency officials, are people, they face
temptations to use their discretion poorly. Constitutional litigation is arguably
the most important part of a judge’s job. It is essential that the Supreme Court
strike the right balance when it devises procedural rules for the exercise of that
awesome power. The Court has not yet done so. The empirical findings explored
in this Article reinforce the first rule of administrative law: Although discretion
is valuable, a healthy skepticism of it is valuable too.

